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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DAHO 
Supreme Court Case No. 36647 
CURTIS-KLURE, PLLC, dba MAPLE 




ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal &om the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE DEBORAH A. BAIL 
MARTIN C. HENDRICKSON 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
MARY V. YORK 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
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Date: 911 812009 Gh Judicial District Court -Ada County=' 
Time: 1 1 :12 AM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 4 Case: CV-OC-2007-16381 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Curtis-kiure Pllc, etal. vs. Ada County Highway District 
User: CCTHIEBJ 
Curtis-klure Pllc, Jack D Klure DDS vs. Ada County Highway District 
Date Code User Judge 


















Complaint Filed Deborah Bail 
Summons Filed Deborah Bail 
Affidavit Of Service 9/14/07 Deborah Bail 
Notice Of Appearance (Mack for ACHD) Deborah Bail 
Notice Of Intent To Take Default Deborah Bail 
Motion to Dismiss Deborah Bail 
Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Deborah Bail 
Notice of Status Conference Hearing Scheduled Deborah Bail 
(Status 01/09/2008 03:30 PM) 
Notice of Hearing (119108 @ 3:00 p.m.) Deborah Bail NOTC 
H RSC 
DCTYLENI 
DCTYLENI Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss Deborah Bail 
01/09/2008 03:OO AM) 
CONV CCLUEDTC Hearing result for Status held on 0110912008 Deborah Bail 
03:30 PM: Conference Vacated 
HRVC CCLUEDTC Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on Deborah Bail 
01/09/2008 03:OO AM: Hearing Vacated 






Amended Notice Of Hearing (118108) Deborah Bail 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss Deborah Bail 
01/08/2008 03:OO PM) 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Deborah Bail 








Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning Deborah Bail 
Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Deborah Bail 
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on Deborah Bail 
01/08/2008 03:OO PM: Hearing Held 
CONV CCLUEDTC Hearing result for Status held on 01/08/2008 Deborah Bail 
03:OO PM: Conference Vacated 
RSPS CCAMESLC Response to Post Hearing Communication with Deborah Bail 
Court Re: Motion to Dismiss 
AFFD CCAMESLC Affidavit in Support of Response to Post Hearing Deborah Bail 
Communication with Court Re: Motion to Dismiss 










Response To Notice of Intent to Dismiss Deborah Bail 
Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment Deborah Bail 
Affidavit of Jack D. Klure D.D.S. in Support of Deborah Bail 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Deborah B a i l 0 0 0 0 3  
Summarv . I i  rrlnment 
MEMO CCG WALAC 
Date: 9/18/2009 Gab Judicial District Court - Ada Count User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 1 1 :12 AM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 4 Case: CV-OC-2007-16381 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Curtis-klure Pllc, etal. vs. Ada County Highway District 
Curtis-klure Pllc, Jack D Klure DDS vs. Ada County Highway District 
Date Code User Judge 
NOTC DCTYLENI Notice of Hearing on Summary Judgment and Deborah Bail 
Status Conference and Scheduling Order 
(1 1/5/08 at 2:30 p.m.) 
HRSC DCTYLENI Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Deborah Bail 
Judgment 11/05/2008 02:30 PM) and Status 
Conference 
STlP CCWRIGRM Stipulation for Extension of Time on Summary Deborah Bail 
Judgment Briefing 
RSPN CCWRIGRM Defendant ACHDs Response to Plaintiffs Motion Deborah Bail 





Affidavit of Steven B Price Deborah Bail 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Deborah Bail 
held on 11/05/2008 02:30 PM: Conference 
Vacated and Status Conference 
HRSC DCTHERTL Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Deborah Bail 
Judgment 11/12/2008 02:30 PM) and Status 
Conference 
AMEN CCGDULKA Amended Notice of Hearing (1 1/12/08 @ 2:30 Deborah Bail 
pm> 
HRSC CCGDULKA Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Deborah Bail 







Motion to Amend Deborah Bail 
Notice Of Hearing 11.12.08 @ 2:30 pm Deborah Bail 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 1 1 11 212008 02:30 Deborah Bail 
PM) Motion to Amend 
RPLY CCDWONCP Reply in Support to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Deborah Bail 
Judgment 
AFFD CCDWONCP Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Reply to Motion Deborah Bail 
for Summary Judgment 
NOTC CCWRIGRM Defendant ACHDs Notice of Non-Opposition to Deborah Bail 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend 
DCHH CCLUEDTC Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Deborah Bail 
held on 11/12/2008 02:30 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 






Hearing result for Motion held on 11/12/2008 Deborah Bail 
02:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion to Amend 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Deborah Bail 
held on 11/12/2008 02:30 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Amended 50 
DEOP DCTHERTL Decision and Order Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Deborah Bail 
Summary Judgment 00004 
Date: 911 812009 Judicial District Court -Ada Count User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 11:12 AM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 4 Case: CV-OC-2007-16381 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Curtis-klure Pllc, etal. vs. Ada County Highway District 
Curtis-klure Pllc, Jack D Klure DDS vs. Ada County Highway District 
Date Code User Judge 
Defendant ACHD'S Motion for Entry of Judgment Deborah Bail MOTN 
OPPO 
CCDWONCP 
CCNELSRF Plaintiffs to Opposition to Defendants Motion for Deborah Bail 





Judgment Deborah Bail 
Civil Disposition entered for: Ada County Highway Deborah Bail 
District,, Defendant; Curtis-klure Pllc, Plaintiff; 
Klure, Jack D DDS, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
211 012009 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed Deborah Bail STAT 
MOTN 
DCTHERTL 






Affidavit of Mary V York Deborah Bail 
Defendant ACHD's Memorandum in Support of Deborah Bail 
Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees 
MEMO CCWRIGRM Defendant ACHDs Memorandum of Costs and Deborah Bail 
Attorney Fees 
MOTN CCGARDAL Motion for Reconsideration of Decision and Order Deborah Bail 
and Withdrawl of Judgment 
HRSC CCAMESLC Notice of Hearing (Motion for Attorney fees and Deborah Bail 
Costs 04/01/2009 02:30 PM) 
STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk Deborah Bail 
action 
STAT CCAMESLC 
MOTN CCFERCJD Motion To Disallow Discretionary Costs And Deborah Bail 
Attorney Fees 
MEMO CCFERCJD Memorandum In Support of Motion To Disallow Deborah Bail 





Second Affidavit Of Jack D. Klure D.D.S. Deborah Bail 
Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Motion To Deborah Bail 
Disallow Discretionary Costs And Attorney Fees 
MEMO CCFERCJD Memorandum In Support Of Motion To reconsider Deborah Bail 





Notice Of Hearing Deborah Bail 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Deborah Bail 
05/06/2009 02:30 PM) Motion for 
Reconsideration of Decision and Order 
Withdrawal of Judgment 
RSPN CCWRIGRM Response to Motion to Disallow Discretionary Deborah Bail 




Second Affidavit of Mary V York Deborah Bail CCWRIGRM 
CCTOWNRD 
CCTOWNRD 
Amended Notice of Hearing Deborah Bail 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/06/2009 02:OO Deborah Bail 
PM) Motion for Reconsideraton of Decision and 
Order (Amended Notice) 
*+-3 p 3  
1"--5 Date: 911 812009 c3h Judicial Dirtrid Court - Ada County%%& User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 11:12 AM ROA Report 
Page 4 of 4 Case: CV-OC-2007-16381 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Curtis-klure Pllc, etal. vs. Ada County Highway District 
Curtis-klure Pllc, Jack D Klure DDS vs. Ada County Highway District 
Date Code User 
DCTHERTL 
Judge 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Deborah Bail 
05/06/2009 02:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
for Reconsideration of Decision and Order 
Withdrawal of Judgment 
HRVC 
DCHH CCLUEDTC Hearing result for Motion for Attorney fees and Deborah Bail 
Costs held on 04/01/2009 02:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: None 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 50 
RSPN CCWRIGRM Response to Motion to Reconsider and Response Deborah Bail 





Order Re: Costs and Fees Deborah Bail 
Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider Deborah Bail 
and to Withdraw Judgment 
DCHH CCLUEDTC Hearing result for Motion held on 05/06/2009 Deborah Bail 
02:OO PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion for Reconsideraton of Decision 
and Order (Amended Notice) 50 
ORDR DCTHERTL Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Withdrawal of Deborah Bail 
Judgment Nunc pro Tunc 











Final Judgment Deborah Bail 
STATUS CHANGED: closed Deborah Bail 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Deborah Bail 
Request for Transcript and Additional Record on Deborah Bail 
Appeal 
NOTC CCWRIGRM Notice of Filing of Receipt for Additional Deborah Bail 
Transcript on Appeal 
GARY G. ALLEN (ISB # 4366) 
DEBORA K. KRISTENSEN (ISB #5337) 
2 MARTIN HENDRICKSON (ISB #5876) 
"=I: GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street - P.O. Box 2720 
a Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
LIIII) 
Telephone: 208-388-1 200 
CL Facsimile: 208-388- 1300 
0 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL, DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CURTIS-KLURE, PLLC, dba MAPLE 





DECLARATORY =LIEF AND 
DAMAGES 
Defendant. I 
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
- 
Plaintiffs allege: 
NATURE OF ACTION 
1. This action results from Defendant's acquisition of real property in conjunction 
with a road-widening project that forced Plaintiffs to relocate a long-established dental practice. 
Plaintiff Maple Grove seeks a declaratory ruling that it is entitled to seek damages from 
Defendant under Idaho Code $7-71 1(2) and an award of such damages. Maple Grove and Klure 
seek damages from Defendant under Idaho Code $40-2004. 
JURY TRIAL REQUESTED 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND DAMAGES - I 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
2. Plaintiff Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba Maple Grove Dentistry ("Maple Grove"), is an 
Idaho professional limited liability company that formerly operated as a dental practice at 
3224 North Maple Grove Road, Boise, Idaho (the "Property"), for more than ten (10) years. At 
all times relevant to this Complaint, Maple Grove was owned equally by Plaintiff Jack D. Klure, 
D.D.S. ("Klure"), and Thomas R. Curtis, D.D.S. ("Curtis"). 
3. Plaintiff Klure is an individual engaged in the business of dentistry in Boise, 
Idaho. 
4. Defendant Ada County Highway District ("ACHD) is a body politic and 
corporate of the State of Idaho responsible for all short-range planning, construction, 
maintenance, operations, rehabilitation and improvements to Ada County's urban streets, rural 
roadways (excluding state highways) and bridges. 
5. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Article V, Section 20 of 
the Idaho Constitution, Idaho Code $9 1-701, 1-705 and other law. The Court has personal 
jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to Idaho Code 5 5-514. 
6.  Venue is proper in this district under Idaho Code $$ 5-404 and 5-51 5 because the 
parties transact business in this district and the claims asserted herein arose in this district. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
7. ACHD is implementing a road improvement project in Boise, Idaho, known as 
Ustick Road, Five Mile to Cole Project-Project No. 504004 (the "Project"). 
8. The Project required the acquisition of property along Ustick Road, including 
portions of real property operated by Maple Grove as a dental practice. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND DAMAGES - 2 
9. At all times relevant to the Complaint, Curtis owned the Property, and Maple 
Grove leased the Property for its dental practices. 
10. Prior to ACHD's acquisition of the Property, Maple Grove had been in business at 
the Property's location for over ten (10) years. 
11. When ACHD announced the Project and its intention to acquire a portion of 
Curtis's property, Klure determined it would be necessary to relocate his dental practice due to 
ACHD's poor reputation and the restricted access to the site that would remain when the Project 
was completed. Ultimately, Klure's decision to relocate required that Klure and Curtis sever 
their long-term business relationship at Maple Grove. 
12. In June 2007, Curtis entered into a settlement agreement with ACHD for just 
compensation for the fee interest in the Property it was acquiring in connection with the Project 
and for Curtis's fifty percent (50%) interest in Maple Grove (the "ACHDICurtis Settlement"). 
13. Klure did not benefit from the ACHDICurtis Settlement; the agreement 
specifically reserved any claims for compensation for damages to Klure or his fifty percent (50%) 
interest in Maple Grove. 
14. Maple Grove attempted to negotiate a settlement with ACHD for the damages 
Klure's interest in Maple Grove suffered as a result of ACHD's decision to acquire the Property, 
but ACHD refused to compensate Maple Grove for any damages the Project caused Klure or his 
interest in Maple Grove. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND DAMAGES - 3 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION-DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT AND DAMAGES 
15. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate as though fully set forth herein paragraphs 1 
though 14 above. 
16. Idaho Code Ij 7-71 l(2) provides for the assessment of business damages that are 
reasonably caused by the taking of land upon which the business is located. To be eligible for 
$ 7-71 l(2) business damages, the business must have more than five (5) years standing and either 
be owned by the party whose lands are being condemned be located upon adjoining lands 
owned by the party whose lands are being condemned. Id. 
17. Prior to ACHD's acquisition of the Property, Maple Grove had been in business at 
the Property for over ten (1 0) years. 
18. Prior to ACHD's acquisition of the Property, Maple Grove was located upon 
adjoining lands owned by Curtis, whose property was sought to be condemned. 
19. Had Maple Grove remained in operation on the Property, it would have suffered 
business damages in excess of the cost of relocation. 
20. Maple Grove incurred business damages in the form of relocating Klure's 
practice, in an amount to be proven at trial, as a direct result of ACHD's decision to acquire the 
Property as part of the Project. 
21. Maple Grove and Klure submitted a written business damages claim to ACHD, 
pursuant to Idaho Code Ij 7-71 1 (i), detailing Klure's relocation costs and seeking reimbursement 
of the same. ACHD rejected Klure's demand and refused to compensate him for any damages 
associated with its acquisition of the Property. 
22. Maple Grove believes that it is legally entitled to seek and obtain damages under 
Idaho Code § 7-71 l(2) as a result of ACHD's acquisition of the Property. ACHD disagrees. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND DAMAGES - 4 
Thus, an actual controversy exists between the parties regarding the application of Idaho Code 
$ 7-71 l(2). 
*. 
<' 23. Maple Grove seeks a judicial declaration that it is entitled to business damages 
\ i from ACHD as a result of the Project under Idaho Code $ 7-71 1(2), together with its reasonable . ./ 
costs and attorneys' fees incurred in bringing this action. 
24. In the event that the Court issues the requested declaratory judgment, Maple 
Grove requests the Court to determine damages pursuant to Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2). 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION-HIGHWAY RELOCATION ASSISTANCE 
25. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate as though fully set forth herein paragraphs 1 
though 24 above. 
26. The Highway Relocation Assistance Program set forth in Idaho Code $ 40-2004 
requires an agency that uses finds for public purposes to compensate those displaced by such 
agency for the "actual and reasonable expense" in moving their business, including the cost of 
moving personal property. 
27. ACHD is using public funds to complete the Project. 
28. Maple Grove and Klure were displaced by the Project when Klure was forced to 
move his dental business and personal property to a new location after the Property was 
conveyed to ACHD as part of the Project. 
29. Maple Grove and Klure incurred relocation damages, in an amount to be proven at 
trial, as a direct result of ACHD's decision to acquire the Property as part of the Project, 
including, but not limited to: 
a. Actual damages in the amount Klure has been required to spend to relocate his 
personal property to a new facility for his dentistry practice; and 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND DAMAGES - 5 
b. Actual damages in the amount Klure has been required to spend to construct the 
new facility to make it suitable for a dentistry practice. 
30. Maple Grove and Klure have demanded that ACHD reimburse its reasonable 
relocation damages caused by ACHD's acquisition of the Property, but ACHD has and continues 
to refuse to do so. 
JURY TRIAL DEMAND 
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court enter judgment against ACHD: 
1. For a declaration that Maple Grove is entitled to damages from ACHD under 
Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2) a result of ACHD's acquisition of the Property for the 
Project; 
2. For a judgment of business and/or relocation damages pursuant to Idaho Code 
5 7-7 1 l(2) in favor of Maple Grove; 
3. For damages, in an amount to be proven at trial, pursuant to Idaho Code 
4 40-2004, in favor of Maple Grove and/or Klure; 
4. For Plaintiffs' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein; and 
5.  For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable. 
DATED this - &ay of September 2007. 
GIVENS P U R S L E ~  LLP 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND DAMAGES - 6 
J. Frederick Mack (ISB #1428) 
Steven C. Bowman (ISB #4404) 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
10 1 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Defendant Ada County Highway District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CURTIS-KLURE, PLLC, dba MAPLE 




ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
CaseNo. CV OC 0716381 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Defendant Ada County Highway District ("ACHD"), by and through its attorneys 
of record, Holland & Hart LLP, hereby moves the Court for an Order dismissing 
Plaintiffs Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba Maple Grove Dentistry and Jack D. Klure, D.D.S.'s 
(collectively "Klure") damage claims contained in their Complaint for Declaratory 
Relief and Damages filed on September 14, 2007. ACHD's motion is brought pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds that 
(1) Klure has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and (2) Klure has 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
failed to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the Court. Accordingly, Klure's complaint 
should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
ACHD's motion is supported by its Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss filed 
contemporaneously with this Motion. 
DATED this 15th day of November, 2007. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 15th day of November, 2007, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Gary G. Allen U.S. Mail 
Debora K. Kristensen Hand Delivered 
Martin Hendrickson Overnight Mail 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP Facsimile 
601 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Phone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS - 3 
J .  Frederick Mack (ISB #1428) 
Steven C. Bowman (ISB #4404) 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
10 1 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
Attorneys for Defendant Ada County Highway District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CURTIS-KLURE, PLLC, dba MAPLE 




ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV OC 071 6381 
DEFENDANT ACHD'S 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' 
POST-HEARING 
COMMUNICATION WITH 
COURT RE: MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 8, 2008, the Court heard argument on Defendant Ada County 
Highway District's ("ACHD") Motion to Dismiss. On January 9th, the day after the 
hearing, counsel for Plaintiffs Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba Maple Grove Dentistry, and 
Jack D. Klure, D.D.S.'s (collectively referred to as "Klure") submitted a letter to the 
Court making further argument on the motion to dismiss. In the letter, Klure's counsel 
stated in no uncertain terms that Klure's business damage claim "is not based upon any 
alleged violation of a constitutional right and does not require the establishment of such 
DEFENDANT ACHD'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' POST-HEARING 
COMMUNICATION WITH COURT RE: MOTION TO DISMISS - 1 
00016 
a property interest." (Klure Correspondence, at 1). A true and correct copy of the 
correspondence is attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Mary V. York submitted 
with this brief. 
ACHD files this brief in response to Klure's letter brief and his newly-stated 
position that his business damage claim is not an inverse condemnation claim or based 
upon any alleged violation of a constitutional right. As presented, Klure's business 
damage claim has no legal basis or support. The provisions of Idaho Code 5 7-71 1 
apply exclusively to eminent domain proceedings and do not form the basis of some 
separate, unspecified claim for damages. There are only two types of eminent domain 
proceedings-a direct condemnation action and an inverse condemnation action. In the 
present case, there has been no direct condemnation action filed by ACHD, and Klure 
has affirmatively stated that his claim is not an inverse condemnation claim or based 
upon a violation of a constitutional right. Klure has no other lawful basis for which to 
make a claim under 5 7-71 1. Without a direct or an inverse eminent domain 
proceeding, Klure can make no claim under 5 7-71 1 and his first cause of action should 
be dismissed. 
11. SUMMARY OF ACHD'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
In his first cause of action, Klure seeks to recover business damages under 5 7- 
71 1 of Idaho's eminent domain code by means of a request for declaratory relief. The 
questions of entitlement and amount of damages involve significant factual issues that 
are not the proper subject of a claim for declaratory relief. Because the relief sought by 
Klure cannot be obtained through a request for declaratory relief, Klure's first cause of 
action should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). 
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Klure's second cause of action should also be dismissed because he has failed to 
follow the statutory mandate that requires him to pursue a claim for relocation 
assistance benefits by petition for judicial review rather than a complaint for damages. 
Alternatively, Klure's second cause of action should be treated as a petition for judicial 
review and subject to all substantive and procedural requirements applicable to a 
petition for judicial review. 
111. RESPONSE TO KLURE'S POST-HEARING 
SUBMISSION TO THE COURT 
In his January 9, 2008 submission to the Court, Klure argues that his claim for 
damages "is not properly characterized as one for inverse condemnation." (Klure 
Correspondence, at 1) (emphasis in original). Counsel for Klure then argues that 
Klure's claim "is not based upon any alleged violation of a constitutional right and does 
not require the establishment of such a property interest." Id. Nevertheless, according 
to counsel for Klure and Klure's complaint, the claim for business damages "is based 
upon Idaho Code Section 7-7 11 (2)." 
Klure makes no attempt to explain or plead the basis for such a claim, and he has 
expressly disclaimed the existence of any of the factual predicates that are required to 
recover an award of damages under Ij 7-71 l(2) - i.e., the existence of a valid property 
right that has been taken without the payment of just compensation. See Covington v. 
Jefferson County, 137 Idaho, 777, 780, 53 P.3d 828, 831(2002) (identifying the 
elements of an inverse condemnation claim). The characterization of Klure's damages 
as being based upon a specific provision of the eminent domain code, but admittedly 
lacking in a claim of a taking or the presence of an eminent domain proceeding, does 
not state a recognized or sustainable cause of action. 
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A. Klure Cannot Recover Damages Under Idaho Code § 7-711 Absent An 
Eminent Domain Proceeding. 
Klure states that he is seeking business damages as provided in 5 7-71 1(2), yet 
he cannot recover such damages absent either a direct condemnation action-which has 
not been instituted-or an inverse condemnation-which Klure admits is not part of this 
case. Absent some form of eminent domain proceeding, there is no basis for Klure to 
assert damages under 5 7-71 1, and his claim must be dismissed. 
1. Section 7-711 is Part of the Statutory Framework for Eminent 
Domain Proceedings and Only Affords Damages Within the 
Context of Eminent Domain. 
Section 7-71 1 is a central component of Idaho's eminent domain law set forth 
within Title 7, Chapter 7 of the Idaho Code. All of the provisions within Title 7, 
Chapter 7 of the Idaho Code deal exclusively with eminent domain proceedings. No 
other proceedings, causes of action, or remedies are identified or discussed in Chapter 
7, and no other causes of action, such as Klure's undefined claim for damages, can be 
brought under its provisions. 
Eminent domain proceedings are special proceedings that are set apart and 
treated differently from more typical causes of action, such as breach of contract or the 
commission of torts. See Payette Lakes Water and Sewer Dist., 103 Idaho 7 17, 71 9, 
653 P.2d 438, 440 (1982) (holding that the provisions of Title 7, Chapter 7 are "special 
proceedings" enacted by the Legislature to provide the "procedural machinery" by 
which the right of eminent domain set forth in the Idaho Constitution may be applied); 
Reuth v. State, 10.0 Idaho 203, 220, 596 P.2d 75, 92 (1978) ("The procedures for 
eminent domain actions have been established by the legislature." (citing Idaho Code, 
Title 7, Chapter 7)); Portneuf Irrigating Co. v. Budge, 16 Idaho 116, 100 P. 1046, 1049- 
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50 (1909) ("At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of this state, the eminent 
domain statutes were classed among the 'special proceedings of a civil nature,' and that 
remedy has uniformly been so recognized and invoked."). 
2. The Plain Language of tj 7-711 Clearly States That It Only 
Applies to Eminent Domain Proceedings. 
Chapter 7 of Title 7 of the Idaho Code is entitled "Eminent Domain." Section 7-  
71 1 is entitled "Assessment of damages." Section 7-71 1 outlines the types of damages 
and the manner in which damages are to be assessed in eminent domain proceedings. 
The text of 5 7-71 1 makes clear that the damages afforded under its provisions only 
apply to eminent domain proceedings. Section 7-71 1 states: 
7-711. Assessment of damages.- The court, jury or referee must hear such 
legal testimony as may be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and 
thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
1. The value of the property sought to be condemned, and all 
improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate 
estate or interest therein; if it consists of different parcels, the value of each 
parcel and each estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed. For 
purposes of ascertaining the value of the property, the minimum amount for 
damages shall be the greater of the assessed value for property tax purposes 
unless the court, jury or referee finds the property has been altered substantially, 
or the plaintiff's highest prelitigation appraisal. 
2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a 
larger parcel: (a) the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by 
the plaintiff; and (b) the damages to any business qualifying under this 
subsection having more than five (5) years' standing which the taking of a 
portion of the property and the construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff may reasonably cause. The business must be owned by 
the party whose lands are being condemned or be located upon adjoining lands 
owned or held by such party. Business damages under this subsection shall not 
be awarded if the loss can reasonably be prevented by a relocation of the 
business or by taking steps that a reasonably prudent person would take, or for 
damages caused by temporary business interruption due to construction; and 
provided further that compensation for business damages shall not be duplicated 
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in the compensation otherwise awarded to the property owner for damages 
pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) (a) of this section 7-71 1, Idaho Code. 
(i) If the business owner intends to claim business damages 
under this subsection, the owner, as defendant, must submit a written 
business damage claim to the plaintiff within ninety (90) days after 
service of the summons and complaint for condemnation. The plaintiffs 
initial offer letter or accompanying information must expressly inform the 
defendant of its rights under this subsection, and must further inform the 
defendant of its right to consult with an attorney. 
(ii) The defendant's written claim must be sent to the plaintiff by 
certified mail, return receipt requested. Absent a showing of a good faith 
justification for the failure to submit a business damage claim within 
ninety (90) days, or an agreed extension by the parties, the court shall 
strike the defendant's claim for business damages in any condemnation 
proceeding. 
(iii) The business damage claim must include an explanation of 
the nature, extent, and monetary amount of such claimed damages and 
must be prepared by the owner, a certified public accountant, or a 
business damage expert familiar with the nature of the operations of the 
defendant's business. The defendant shall also provide the plaintiff with 
copies of the defendant's business records that substantiate the good faith 
offer to settle the business damage claim. The business damage claim 
must be clearly segregated from the claim for property damages pursuant 
to subsections (1) and (2)(a) of this section 7-71 1, Idaho Code. 
(iv) As used in this subsection, the term "business records" 
includes, but is not limited to, copies of federal and state income tax 
returns, state sales tax returns, balance sheets, and profit and loss 
statements for the five (5) years preceding which are attributable to the 
business operation on the property to be acquired, and other records 
relied upon by the business owner that substantiate the business damage 
claim. 
(v) The plaintiff's good faith in failing to offer compensation 
for business damages shall not be contested at a possession hearing held 
pursuant to section 7-721, Idaho Code, if the defendant has not given 
notice of its intent to claim business damages prior to the date of filing of 
the motion that initiates the proceeding under that section. 
3. Separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, 
and each estate or interest therein, will be specially and directly benefited, if at 
all, by the construction of the improvement proposed by the plaintiff; and if the 
benefit shall be equal to the damages assessed, under subsection 2. of this 
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section, the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the 
value of the portion taken; but if the benefit shall be less than the damages so 
assessed, the former shall be deducted from the latter, and the remainder shall be 
the only damages allowed in addition to the value. 
4. If the property sought to be condemned be for a railroad, the cost 
of good and sufficient fences along the line of such railroad, and the cost of 
cattle guards where fences may cross the line of such railroad. 
5. As far as practicable, compensation must be assessed for each 
source of damages separately. 
6 .  If the property sought to be condemned is private real property 
actively devoted to agriculture, the damages which will accrue because of the 
costs, if any, of farming around electrical transmission line structure(s) for a 
transmission line with a capacity in excess of two hundred thirty (230) kilovolts. 
If the property sought to be condemned has been the subject of a previous 
condemnation proceeding or proceedings for electrical transmission line 
structure(s) and at the time of condemnation the field holds other electrical 
transmission line structure(s), such evidence of costs referred to above may also 
include the cumulative effects, if any, of conducting farming operations around 
other electrical transmission line structure(s) in the same field, whether such 
structure(s) are of the condemner or not. 
I.C. 5 7-71 1 (emphasis added). The plain language of 5 7-71 1 and its pervasive 
references to condemnation proceedings, takings, compensation, and other eminent 
domain principles make it clear that the award of damages is contingent upon the 
exercise of eminent domain or the bringing of a condemnation action. 
The introductory language of the statute provides that testimony may be offered 
by "any of the parties to the proceedings." I.C. 5 7-7 11. There is no question that "the 
proceedings" referenced in the statute are the eminent domain proceedings that are the 
subject of the entirety of Title 7, Chapter 7. Reuth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 220, 596 
P.2d 75, 92 (1978) ("The procedures for eminent domain actions have been established 
by the legislature.") (citing to ldaho Code, Title 7, Chapter 7) (emphasis added); see 
City of McCull v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 584, 130 P.3d 1 1 18, 1122 (2006) ("Idaho 
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Code $ 7-71 1 sets forth the requirements a business must meet in order to make a claim 
for business damages in an eminent domain proceeding.") (emphasis added); City of 
Orofno v. Swayne, 95 Idaho 125, 127, 504 P.2d 398,400 (1972) ("The legislature 
provided a method for ascertainment of just compensation by enactment of I.C. 5 7- 
71 1.") (emphasis added); State ex rel. Symms v. City of Mountain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 
53 1, 493 P.2d 387, 390(1972) ("The assessment of damages in an eminent domain 
action in governed by Section 7-71 1 of the Idaho Code.") (emphasis added). 
The fact that this provision applies only to eminent domain proceedings is made 
even more clear by the specific references throughout the statute to condemnation 
proceedings: 
3 "The value of property sought to be condemned. . . ." I.C. 5 7-71 l(1) 
(emphasis added). 
3 "If the property sought to be condemned . . . ." I.C. 5 7-71 l(2) 
(emphasis added). 
3 "the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be 
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be 
condemned . . . ." I.C. 5 7-7 11 (2)(a) (emphasis added). 
3 "the damages to any business qualifying under this subsection having 
more than five (5) years' standing which the taking of a portion of the 
property and the construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff may reasonably cause." I.C. 5 7-7 1 1 (2)(b) 
(emphasis added). 
3 "The business must be owned by the party whose lands are being 
condemned. . . ." Id. (emphasis added). 
k "the owner, as defendant, must submit a written business damage claim to 
the plaintiff within ninety (90) days after service of the summons and 
complaint for condemnation." I.C. 5 7-7 1 1 (2)(b)(ii) (emphasis 
added). 
3 "the court shall strike the defendant's claim for business damages in any 
condemnation proceeding." I.C. $ 7-71 1(2)(b)(ii) (emphasis added). 
P "The plaintiff's good faith in failing to offer compensation for business 
damages shall not be contested at a possession hearing held pursuant 
to section 7-721, Idaho Code . . . ." I.C. 5 7-71 1(2)(b)(v) (referencing 
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just compensation and other proceedings particular to eminent domain 
proceedings) (emphasis added). 
"Separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned.  . . . Y Y  
I.C. 5 7-71 l(3). 
> "the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the 
value of tlzeportion taken[.]" I.C. 5 7-71 l(3) (emphasis added). 
P "If the property sought to be condemned be for a railroad . . . ." I.C. 5 7- 
71 l(4) (emphasis added). 
3 "If the property sought to be condemned is private real property actively 
devoted to agriculture . . . ." I.C. 5 7-71 l(6) (emphasis added). 
P "If the property sought to be condemned has been the subject of a 
previous condemnation proceeding or proceedings for electrical 
transmission line structure(s) and at the time of condemnation . . . . ,, 
Id. (emphasis added). 
There can be no question that the provisions of 5 7-7 11 are strictly meant to apply to 
eminent domain proceedings. 
3. The Legislative History of Recent Amendments to 5 7-711 
Provide That the Statute Relates "to [the] Assessment of 
Damages in Eminent Domain Proceedings." 
Any remaining uncertainty whether the provisions of 5 7-71 1 apply exclusively 
to  eminent domain proceedings are easily dispelled by a review of the legislative 
history the statute. In 2000, 5 7-71 1 was amended to add to subsection (2) the business 
damages provisions upon which Klure relies as the basis for his claim. H.B. 68 1, Idaho 
State Legislature, 55th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (2000). There, the proposed legislation 
describes its function and purpose as follows: 
EMINENT DOMAIN - Amends existing law relating to eminent 
domain proceedings to revise the formula and procedure for assessment 
of damages when the damages are to any established business of more 
than five years' standing; and to provide that in eminent domain 
proceedings, the plaintiff's good faith in failing to offer compensation for 
business damages shall not be contested at hearing if the defendant has 
not given notice of its intent to claim business damages prior to the date 
of filing the motion that initiates the proceeding under this section. 
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Id. (emphasis added). 
Similarly, the title of the legislation clearly states that the amendments to 5 7-  
71 1 to add business damage provisions relates "to [the] assessment of damages in 
Eminent Domain proceedings." Id. Set forth in full, the title of House Bill No. 68 1 
states that it is: 
An Act relating to assessment of damages in eminent domain 
proceedings; amending section 7-71 1, Idaho Code, to revise the formula 
and procedure for assessment of damages when the damages are to any 
established business of more than five years' standing, to make a technical 
correction and to provide that plaintiff's good faith in failing to offer 
compensation for business damages shall not be contested at hearing if the 
defendant has not given notice of its intent to claim business damages 
prior to the date of filing the motion that initiates the proceeding. 
Id. 
Finally, the Statement of Purpose for the legislation states conclusively that the 
business damages provisions of 3 7-71 1 were added to increase the scope of just 
compensation to be paid in an eminent domain proceeding. The State of Purpose 
provides, 
"Just compensation" is a constitutional requirement in the event of a 
taking under eminent domain condemnation law. The question of how 
"just" the compensation may be is established, in part, through statute. 
This proposed legislation would expand consideration of "j'just 
compensation" in eminent domain condemnations to damages to 
businesses of more than five years' standing which are located upon, or 
adjoined to, a property being taken. 
Id., Statement of Purpose (emphasis added). 
The Act's specific references to "eminent domain" proceedings, "condemnation" 
actions, and the establishment of "just compensation" leave no question that the 
provisions of the statute apply exclusively to such proceedings. See State v. Holder, 
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290 P. 387, 389 (1930) ("The legislative intent must control our interpretation of the 
act, as determined from the title and the language of the act itself."); State ex rel. 
Turner v. Coffin, 9 Idaho 338, 74 P. 962, 966-67 (1903) (quoting Section 16 of Article 3 
of  the Idaho Constitution, which provides that "every act shall embrace but one subject 
and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title" 
and holding that "[tlhe Constitution has made the title the conclusive index to the 
legislative intent as to what shall be operative."). 
Any other interpretation of 7-71 1 and its damages provisions would lead to a 
result not intended by the legislature and would render meaningless the stated purpose 
of the statute. Such an interpretation runs contrary to the basic principles of statutory 
interpretation. Kingsbury v. Genessee Sch. Dist. No. 282, 132 Idaho 791, 979 P.2d 
1 149 (1 999) (holding that statutory interpretation that renders a statute meaningless is 
contrary to the general rules of statutory construction); Buker v. Sullivan, 132 Idaho 
746, 750, 979 P.2d 619, 623 (1999) ("In construing a statute, this Court will not deal 
with any subtle refinements of the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to the 
purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act and every word therein, 
lending substance and meaning to the provisions.") (quoting Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410, 415, 849 P.2d 83, 88 (1993)); Doh1 v. 
PSF Industries, Inc., 127 Idaho 232, 237, 899 P.2d 445, 450 (1995) ("Statutes are to be 
construed to ascertain and give effect to the purpose of the legislation and to give force 
and effect to every part of the provision."). 
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B. Klure Has Admitted That His Business Damage Claim Is Not Properly 
Presented As a Damage Claim Under $j 7-711. 
Through his admission that his business damage claim is not brought as an 
inverse condemnation claim, Klure has acknowledged that he has not pled a proper 
claim under 8 7-7 1 1. The provisions of tj 7-71 1 only apply to eminent domain 
proceedings, and no such cause of action has been brought. Klure may not remove the 
compensation/damages provisions from their constitutional and statutory context and 
create an entirely new cause of action not contemplated or approved by the legislature. 
Section 7-71 1 does not operate outside of or independently from the realm of 
condemnation. 
C .  City of McCall v. Seubert, Cited By Klure in His Letter, Does Not Create A 
New Cause of Action for $j 7-711 Independent from Idaho's Eminent Domain 
Laws. 
In his letter to the Court, Klure's counsel relies upon the case of City of McCalE 
v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 11 18 (2006) in support of his contention that he 
may bring an unspecified claim for damages under 8 7-71 1. The case contains no such 
support and in fact, further reinforces the fact that a claim under 8 7-71 1 can only be 
brought in an eminent domain proceeding. 
In the Seubert case, the Idaho Transportation Department ('"TD") brought a 
condemnation action against defendants to acquire a strip of property that would allow 
ITD to construct its roadway project. Id., at 583, 130 P.3d at 1121. Within the context 
of the condemnation case, two interveners "asserted claims for business damages in 
connection with the proposed condemnation." Id. On appeal, the City sought to obtain 
a determination that the interveners did not have a property interest that would entitle 
them to condemnation business damages. Id. 
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In analyzing the City's appeal, the Supreme Court clearly stated that "Idaho 
Code $ 7-71 1 sets forth the requirements a business must meet in order to make a claim 
for business damages in an eminent domain proceeding." Id., at 584, 130 P.3d at 
1122 (emphasis added). The Court went on to describe the specific elements a business 
must establish to obtain such damages. Id. It stated that "the business must be owned 
by the party whose lands are being condemned or be located upon adjoining lands 
owned or held by such party." Id. In the Seubert case, the Court determined that the 
interveners fell within the second category of landowners-those that owned "the 
business located on land immediately adjoining the condemned piece of property and on 
land owned by the condemnee" and therefore the interveners could properly claim 
damages within the condemnation action. The Seubert case in no uncertain terms holds 
that $ 7-71 1 applies to claims for business damages within an eminent domain 
proceeding, and does not support Klure's contention that it can assert a business 
damage claim outside of that context. Id. 
Moreover, even the portion of the Seubert case cited by counsel specifically 
states that the availability of damages under $ 7-71 1 is when there is "a claim for 
damages resulting from a taking of the underlying property." (Klure Correspondence, 
at 2 (quoting Seubert, 142 Idaho at 584, 130 P.3d at 1122) (emphasis added). The 
quoted portion of the case also states that "The right to receive business damages . . . 
resulting from a taking of land is strictly a statutory right." Id. (quoting 29A C.J.S. 
Eminent Domain $ 150 (2004)) (emphasis added). It cannot be more clear that business 
damages under the statutory provisions of $ 7-71 1 is only available when there is a 
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taking and when the statutory prerequisites have been meet. Here, as acknowledged by 
Klure, neither has occurred. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court as early as 1909, "Lilt must be 
remembered that the Constitution of this state authorizes the taking of private property 
for public use upon payment of a just compensation, "to be ascertained in a manner 
prescribed by law." Portneuf, 16 Idaho 1 16, 100 P. at 1050. The "manner" prescribed 
by the Legislature to determine the "just compensation" to be allowed," is set forth in 
Idaho Code tj 7-71 1. It only applies to damage awards within the context of 
condemnation cases and may not be removed from that framework to create some new 
and unauthorized cause of action. 
Section 7-71 1 is an integral part of the procedural framework established by the 
Idaho Legislature to govern eminent domain proceedings and the award of damages 
when a taking has occurred. Klure says that his damage claim is based on 8 7-71 1, but 
he refuses to plead an inverse condemnation claim-and in fact he expressly 
acknowledges that it is not an inverse condemnation case. For this reason, and based on 
the authority previously cited that precludes a claim for damages being brought by way 
of a claim for declaratory relief, Klure's first cause of action should be dismissed. 
DATED this 15th day of January, 2008. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP , 
Ada cddnty ~ i ~ h d 6 y  District 
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This is an action by the plaintiffs, Curtis-Klure, PLLC and Jack D. Klure, D.D.S., 
for declaratory relief and damages against the Ada County Highway District ("ACHD") 
arising from a road-widening project on Ustick Road in Boise, Idaho. The plaintiffs/ 
damage claims arises fkom Dr. Klure's decision to move his dental practice and "sever" 
his business relationship with his long-standing partner because of his concern about an 
ACHD road widening project. The Complaint asks that the Court determine if the 
plaintiffs are entitled to business damages and then to "determine damages pursuant to 
I.C. $7-71 l(2)" and for damages under the Idaho Highway Relocation Assistance 
Program, I.C. $ 40-2004. ACHD has moved to dismiss the action under I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(l), lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. 
I. 
Issues 
The key issues raised by ACHD are: 
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction to decide the claims raised in the Complaint? 
2. Even if jurisdiction is proper, should the Complaint be dismissed for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted? 
ACHD also attacked the plaintiffs' request for trial by jury. However, since jury 
trials are available in some instances in declaratory judgment cases under I.R.C.P. 57 and 
are available in eminent domain actions pursuant to I.C. $ 7-7 1 1, the Court will not 
address the issue further since even an incorrect demand for trial by jury would not 




At the outset, the Court notes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over both the 
declaratory judgment claim and the claim under I.C. 8 7-71 1. The claim for relocation 
expenses under I.C. $40-2004, however, presents an issue which must be addressed in a 
petition for judicial review, not in this proceeding. 
Under Art. V $ 20 of the Idaho Constitution, district courts have original 
jurisdiction in all cases in Idaho, both at law and equity, and appellate jurisdiction where 
provided for by law. The Idaho Declaratory Judgment Act gives "courts of record," 
which district courts most certainly are, the power to "declare rights, status, and other 
legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." I.C. $ 10- 1201. 
One of the finest cases in Idaho discussing the difference between subject matter 
jurisdiction and the situation in which a court with jurisdiction declines to exercise it 
(referred to as "primary" jurisdiction in the Decision) is Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 
99 Idaho 624, 586 P.2d 1068 (1978). In that case, Judge Durstchi, writing for a 
unanimous Supreme Court, in a declaratory judgment action which sought injunctive 
relief against the Director of Insurance, talked about the "considerable mischief' caused 
by confusing subject matter jurisdiction with questions over venue or defenses which 
might bar relief or make it "improper or inappropriate" for a court with jurisdiction to 
proceed. The Sierra Life Supreme Court reaffirmed the classic definition of subject 
matter jurisdiction first laid out in Richardson v. Ruddy, 15 Idaho 488,98 P 842 (1908) 
that subject matter jurisdiction is the right of a court to exercise judicial power over a 
class of cases, not the particular case before it, "but rather the abstract power to try a case 
of the kind or character of the one pending; and not whether the particular case is one that 
presents a cause of action, or under the particular facts is triable before the court in which 
it is pending, because of some inherent facts which exist and may be developed during 
trial." 15 Idaho at 494 cited in Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho at 628. In 
determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, the question is not whether 
the complaint states a good cause of action or the plaintiff is entitled to relief but whether 
the court has the power to act at all. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata involved a challenge 
to a "proposed unlawful action" by the Director of Insurance which might result in 
irreparable harm. The Supreme Court observed that a court may choose not to act until 
an administrative agency has determined an issue but that does not mean that the court 
necessarily lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies does not deprive a court, which otherwise has jurisdiction, of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, supra, 99 Idaho at 627. The Idaho Supreme 
Court held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the Idaho 
Declaratory Judgment Act to resolve the questions submitted to it and, therefore, issued a 
writ of mandamus compelling the district court to assume jurisdiction in the underlying 
declaratory judgment action. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata still provides a useful 
framework for analyzing general issues of subject matter jurisdiction although subsequent 
cases have resulted in a finer tuning of the interplay of subject matter jurisdiction and 
exhaustion of remedies in cases involving administrative agencies. (See, Regan v. 
Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721, 100 P.3d 61 5 (2004), where the Court held that absent 
the "interests of justice" or a situation where the agency acts outside of its authority, the 
district court only obtains subject matter jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action 
after the administrative remedies are exhausted and White v. Bannock County 
Commissioners, 139 Idaho 396,401, 80 P.3d 332 (2003) where the Court held that no 
one is entitled to judicial relief until their administrative remedies are exhausted.) The 
basic principle remains that the question of subject matter jurisdiction depends not on 
whether a particular claim fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted but 
whether the class of cases is one which the court has the power to address. If an 
administrative agency has jurisdiction over a particular cause of action, a court will not 
exercise its jurisdiction, absent one of two exceptions, until the administrative remedies 
are exhausted. 
A declaratory judgment action is appropriate to declare "rights, status, and other 
legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." I.C. 5 10-1201 
Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 133 P.3d 1232 (2006). Idaho has long recognized 
that the Declaratory Judgment Act gives district courts subject matter jurisdiction over 
claims for declaratory relief. E.g. Idaho Mutual Benefit Association v. Robison, 65 Idaho 
793, 154 P.2d 156 (1944); Whitney v. Randall, 58 Idaho 49,70 P.2d 384 (1937). 
I.R.C.P. 57 and I.C. $ 10-1201 provide specifically that the "existence of another 
adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is 
appropriate." See, also, Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513,681 P.2d 988 (1984). 
In Carter v. State, Department ofHeaEth and Felfare, 103 Idaho 701,652 P.2d 649 
(1982)' the Idaho Supreme Court noted that, although it is proper to award declaratory 
relief where there are other adequate remedies available, Rule 57 "presupposes an initial 
determination that a declaratory judgment action is itself an appropriate remedy." 103 
Idaho at 702. A declaratory judgment action is not the proper mechanism to collaterally 
challenge an agency action which ought to be challenged by appeal. Id. A declaratory 
judgment action is also not a substitute for an action in tort and should not be used to 
determine if a party has been negligent nor the amount of damages which would flow 
from such negligence. Ennis v. Casey, 72 Idaho 181,238 P.2d 435 (1951). It is not 
proper where the questions presented should be the subject of "judicial investigation" in 
a regular action. Ennis, 72 Idaho at 185. As Carter held, the key issue for the 
appropriateness of declaratory relief depends upon whether there is an issue relating to 
the parties' rights or status under a contract, writing or statute. However, a declaratory 
judgment action is not available when the g& issue is the amount of damages nor is it 
available as a collateral challenge to an agency action or a substitute for long recognized 
causes of action. 
Issues of fact may be determined in connection with a declaratory judgment 
action if necessary to resolve a question of a party's rights or legal status. I.C. 5 10-1209. 
Issues of fact necessary to determine a party's rights or status may be tried by a jury in an 
appropriate case. I.C. $ 10-1209; I.R.C.P. 57.' 
1 The issue in Farmers insurance Exchange v. Tucker, 142 Idaho 191, 125 P.3d 1067 (2005) was the ability 
of a party to amend a complaint for declaratory relief to add a claim for damages when there was already a 
pending claim in another court on the same subject, it is not authority for the proposition that an action for 
damages may never be combined with a declaratory judgment action. The case arose out of a car accident 
in Montana in which a child was killed. A declaratory judgment action involving an arbitration provision 
in two insurance policies was brought in Idaho. A wrongful death action was filed in Montana. The 
Supreme Court upheld the district court's refusal to permit the insurance company's motion to amend the 
The central question for the plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claim is: what right 
or status under any statute does the plaintiff seek to resolve? In the Complaint, the 
plaintiffs request that the Court make a declaratory ruling that the plaintiffs are entitled to 
seek damages under I.C. 3 7-71 l(2). The Complaint alleges that Thomas R. Curtis, 
D.D.S., and Jack D. Klure, D.D.S., were equal partners for ten years in an Idaho 
professional limited liability company, Curtis-Klure, PLLC. It alleges that, as a result of 
his concerns about an ACHD road widening project for Ustick Road, Dr. Klure decided 
to relocate his dental practice. He alleges that he "severed" his long term business 
relationship with Dr. Curtis although the details of the "severing" are not spelled out. 
The Complaint is clear that neither the limited liability company nor Dr. Klure owned the 
real property. The Complaint alleges that Curtis-Klure leased the property. It is not clear 
when Dr. Klure left the partnership nor what the terms of hls departure were. The 
Complaint alleges that Dr. Curtis, who was the property owner, negotiated a settlement 
with ACHD for just compensation for his fee interest in the property and "for Curtis's 
fifty percent (50%) interest in the LLC. The plaintiffs allege that they "did not benefit 
from the ACHDICurtis Settlement; the agreement specifically reserved any claims for 
compensation for damages to Klure or his fifty (50%) interest in Maple Grove." 
Complaint, pg. 3. The Complaint asserts a claim for business damages for the relocating 
of Dr. Klure's practice. It also alleges that a written business damages claim was 
submitted to ACHD pursuant to I.C. tj 7-71 1. The plaintiffs "seek a judicial declaration 
that it is entitled to business damages from ACHD as a result of the Project under I.C. 5 
7-71 1(2)." Complaint, pg. 5. It then requests that the Court determine damages. To the 
extent that the plaintiffs request the Court to determine if Idaho law would permit 
complaint to add a damages claim to the Idaho action when there was already a pending action for damages 
in Montana which was a more appropriate forum. 
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damages for the type of harrn suffered by them, they have stated a claim for declaratory 
relief because it would relate to the plaintiffs' rights or status under Idaho law. 
The Court will not exercise jurisdiction over the claim for relocation expenses 
under I.C. 9 40-2004 since the primary jurisdiction for such a claim lies with the agency 
and its decision is subject to review in the district court only by way of a petition for 
review under the Idaho APA. I.C. 9 40-2004 provides that as part of the cost of any 
public program or project, the agency using b d s  for a public purpose is to compensate a 
displaced person for the "actual and reasonable" expense of moving a business and for 
direct losses of "tangible personal property as the result of moving or discontinuing a 
business.. ." There are specific requirements for payments for the moving of a business. 
I.C. 9 40-2004(3). The Highway Relocation Assistance Act commits the initial decision 
on reimbursement for relocation expenses to the agency which is responsible for paying 
for the project. I.C. § 40-2004. If a "displaced person" is dissatisfied with the agency's 
determination on relocation payments, then the decision is subject to review under the 
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act. I.C. 9 40-2010; I.C. $ 67-5201 et. seq. While a 
district court eventually has jurisdiction over a relocation expense dispute under I.C. 9 
40-2004, the manner in which it comes before the district court is a petition for judicial 
review after the administrative remedies are exhausted. I.C. $ 67-5270 and 967-5271. 
Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721,100 P.3d 61 5 (2004); White v. Bannock 
County Commissioners, 139 Idaho 396,401, 80 P.3d 332 (2003). The claim for 
relocation benefits under I.C. $ 40-2004 is not properly before the Court at this time and 
the motion to dismiss is granted with respect to that claim. 
The proper method of contesting an agency decision is an appeal, not a 
declaratory judgment action which is not a vehicle for a collateral attack on an agency 
action. Carter V. State, Department of Health and Welfare, 103 Idaho 701, 652 P.2d 649 
(1982). While it is true that in St. Benedict 's Hosp. v. County of Twin Fulls, 107 Idaho 
143,686 P.2d 88 (Ct. App. 1984), an indigent aid case, the Court of Appeals 
countenanced the treatment of a complaint as though it were a petition for judicial 
review, the facts of that case are so unique that its application is or should be very 
limited. In St. Benedict 's, there was not only no record of any agency hearing or other 
action, but there was no record of a written application for indigent aid by the hospital 
and, likewise, there was no written denial by the County either so a trial was required on 
the issue of whether there was an initial application. The case was tried before the 
magistrate who determined that an application had been filed by the hospital and that it 
had been denied by the County without a hearing, without keeping minutes of its action 
and without notifying the hospital in writing of its decision. The factual background of 
St. Benedict 's is very unusual. There is no hint in St. Benedict 's that the hospital was 
trying to do an end run around the normal procedures for judicial review of an agency 
action; instead, it appeared that the County had done everything it could to stymie 
judicial review. In the normal course of events, the district court does not exercise 
jurisdiction over an issue which is initially committed to an agency for determination 
until the agency has acted and the adverse party has filed a petition for judicial review. 
There do not appear to be unusual factors which would warrant the Court assuming 
jurisdiction over the Highway Relocation Act claim in this action. The claim should be 
presented in a separate action based upon a petition for judicial review. 
The plaintiffs also claim a right to damages under I.C. 8 7-71 1. The district court 
has subject matter jurisdiction over eminent domain proceedings. I.C. $ 7-706. 
B. Failure to State a Claim. 
The defendant also seeks to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim should not be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Taylor v. 
Maile, 142 Idaho 253,257, 127 P.3d 156 (2005); citing: Gardner v. Hollzfzeld, 96 Idaho 
609,6 1 1, 533 P.2d 730,732 (1 975). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court looks 
no further than the pleadings. Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 152 P.3d 81 8 (2007); 
Young v. City ofk'etchum, 137 Idaho 102,104,44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). With the sole 
focus on the pleadings, the non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the 
record viewed in his favor. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102,44 P.3d 
1157 (2002). The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail on its claims but 
whether the plaintiff can offer evidence to support them. BHA Investments, Inc. v. City 
of Boise, 138 Idaho 356,63 P.3d 482 (2003); Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 126 Idaho 
960, 895 P.2d 561(1995). 
In the Complaint, the plaintiff requests that the court make a declaratory ruling 
that the plaintiffs are entitled to seek damages under LC. 8 7-71 l(2). As discussed above, 
the exact interest of the plaintiffs is not entirely clear. Dr. Klwe had been an equal 
partner for several years in the partnership but he "severed" his relationship with the 
partnership in anticipation of AC1-EDYs project. The partnership, according to the 
Complaint, leased but did not own the real property. As noted above, the question of 
whether a party may raise a claim under a statute is an appropriate subject for a 
declaratory judgment action. 
The plaintiffs' second cause of action requests compensation under I.C. 5 7-71 1, 
an eminent domain statute. All that is required of a pleading is that it contain a "short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' and a 
demand for judgment. I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure permit the 
raising of two or more claims as well as alternative claims for relief in the same action . 
I.R.C.P. 8(e)(2). A claim is not insufficient just because an alternative claim raised in the 
same pleading is insufficient. Id. Technical pleading rules have been abandoned for a 
considerable period of time. E.g., Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 33, 13 P.3d 857, 
864 (2000); Hauschulz v. Department of Correction, 143 Idaho 462, 147 P.3d 94 (2006). 
The claim for damages under the eminent domain statute is not invalidated simply 
because the claim for damages under I.C. $40-2004 has been dismissed. Furthennore, 
there is no case law which supports the position that an otherwise adequately plead claim 
is inadequate if certain terminology is not used. It is not essential that the plaintiffs 
denominate their claim as one for inverse condemnation. They have stated the factual 
basis for their claim and have made specific reference to the statute under which they 
claim relief. It is clear that they are asserting a right to relief under Idaho's eminent 
domain statutes. Whether the plaintiffs are actually entitled to such relief is not currently 
before the court. 
Giving the plaintiffs the benefit of drawing all favorable inferences in their favor, 
The allegations of the Complaint, with the exception of the claim for relocation expenses 
under I.C. 9 40-2004, are sufficiently stated so as to preclude a motion to dismiss at this 
time.* 
2 After the oral argument in this case, counsel for the plaintiffs submitted additional authority and 
argument by way of a letter sent to the Court and to the defendants' counsel. The letter was forwarded to 
my law clerk and was not viewed by me until a written brief was submitted by the defendants. I reviewed 
both just prior to the release of th~s Decision. The letter cited to City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 
130 P.3d 11 18 (2006). I have no objection to receiving additional citations after oral argument if 
something completely unanticipated is discussed in oral argument, however, particularly if a party wishes 
to extensively discuss any additional case law, it is preferable to submit additional argument by way of a 
brief with a request for leave of the Court to file it. Both sides have seen the letter. Both have addressed 
the issue. The additional submission has not affected the Court's view that, reading the Complaint most 
Conclusion 
For the reasons stated in this Decision, the claim for relocation expenses under 
I.C. 5 40-2004 is dismissed since it must be presented through a petition for judicial 
review after the exhaustion of administrative remedies. A declaratory judgment action is 
an appropriate cause of action to determine ifa party is entitled to recover under a statute. 
There is no bar in the Declaratory Judgment Act or I.R.C.P. 57 to joining an action for 
declaratory relief with other causes of action. Thus, as to the claim for declaratory relief 
and damages under I.C. 8 7-71 1, giving the plaintiffs the benefit of all favorable 
inferences, the motion to dismiss is denied.3 
It is so ordered. 
Deborah A. Bail 
District Judge 
favorably to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have stated claims which are not subject to dismissal at thls time. 
The deficiencies in the claim for damages under I.C. $7-7 1 1 should be raised by way of summary 
judgment since the factual record at this stage is simply absent and the standards for a motion to dismiss 
have not been met. However, both parties are advised that it is not my practice to accept supplemental 
briefing after oral arguments without express permission for the filing of additional material. 
The Court does have questions about whether the plaintiffs have a cornpensable interest and a 
right to recover under I.C. 5 7-71 1 but, to resolve those questions, the factual record must be more Eully 
fleshed out, probably by a motion for summary judgment. 
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Defendant. 
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs, Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba Maple Grove Dentistry and 
Jack D. Klure, D.D.S., by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP, and 
move the Court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b) for an order granting 
summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs on the issue of Defendant Ada County 
Highway District's liability for the Plaintiffs' business damages under Idaho Code 5 7- 
This motion is supported by the Affidavit of Jack D. Klure and the Melnoranduni 
in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Sunlmary Judgment, filed contemporaneously 
herewith. 
The Defendant also respectfully requests that the Court set a hearing on which 
oral argument may be heard on this motion. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Plaintiffs, 
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CURTIS-KLURE, PLLC, dba MAPLE GROVE 
DENTISTRY, and JACK D. KLURE, D.D.S., 
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
Case No. CV OC 07 163 8 1 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT ACHD'S RESPONSE 
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment in which they seek a 
determination from the Court that they are entitled to business damages pursuant to the business 
damages provisi~ns of Idaho's eminent domain statutes. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Pla. Mem.") p. 1). Plaintiffs' motion is properly denied for the 
following reasons. First, there is no independent cause of action for business damages under 
Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2) absent a direct or inverse condemnation proceeding. And where ACHD - - 
has not initiated any direct condemnation action, Plaintiffs' only claim for business damages 
under Idaho's eminent domain statutes is within the context of an inverse condemnation action. 
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Second, Plaintiffs cannot prevail in an inverse condemnation proceeding, because they do 
not own any compensable interest that would entitle them to recover damages under Idaho's 
- _I - - - - -~  __C___C_ 
business damages statute, Idaho Code 4 7-71 l(2). Thus, without any compensable property 
rights, Plaintiffs cannot maintain an inverse condemnation action. 
Third, even if Plaintiffs did have a compensable interest in the real property at issue in 
this case, there has been no "taking" by ACHD of any property owned by Plaintiffs. Thus, 
where no taking has occurred, there is no basis for Plaintiffs' claim, and their summary judgment 
motion is properly denied. 
And fourth, even if a taking did occur, Plaintiffs can only recover business damages 
under Idaho Code 9 7-7 1 l(2) if they are unable to relocate their business, and here Plaintiffs not 
only can, but have, successfully relocated their business. As such, Plaintiffs may not recover 
business damages pursuant to Idaho Code 4 7-7 1 l(2). 
In support of its response to Plaintiffs' motion, ACHD has filed the Affidavit of Steven 
B. Price contemporaneously with this motion. 
11. BACKGROUND AND FACTS 
In late 2005, ACHD began moving forward on its project for the reconstruction and 
improvement of Ustick Road from Five Mile to Cole Road ("the Project"). (Affidavit of Steven 
B. Price ("Price Aff.") 1/ 17). The construction of the Project was designed to create better traffic 
flow, decrease congestion, and improve sidewalk safety. (Id.) In order to effectuate the 
improvements and construction of the Project, ACHD determined that it needed tc acquire 
various parcels of land. (Id. at 1/ 19). 
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Among the properties necessary for the Project was a strip of land located along Ustick 
Road and Maple Grove Road. (Id. at 7 20). This strip of land was approximately 13 feet wide 
and 1,000 feet long and totaled approximately 13,000 square feet. (Id., Exs. C, D). 
As it relates to the current dispute, the property required for the Project crossed several 
different parcels, each with different ownership. (Id. at f 23). As shown on the aerial photograph 
at Exhibit D to the Affidavit of Steven B. Price, the property required for the Project, which is 
identified in orange and yellow, runs along the edge of Parcel 45 adjacent to Ustick Road, then 
through Parcel 46, across the parking lot of another portion of Parcel 45, and then through Parcel 
44. (Id. at n23-24,  Ex. D). Up until ACHD purchased the properties in 2007, the ownership of 
the properties was as follows: Parcel 44 was owned by Maple Grove Parking, LLC, Parcel 45 
was owned by Maple Grove Professional Center Owners Association, Inc., and Parcel 46 was 
owned by Thomas Curtis, D.D.S. (Id. at f 25, Ex. D). 
In addition to his ownership of Parcel 46, Dr. Curtis also owned an undivided 113 interest 
in Parcel 45, which is the common area between the buildings owned by the Maple Grove 
Professional Center Owners Association, Inc. ("Parcel 45'7, and an undivided one-third interest 
in Parcel 44, which is owned by Maple Grove Parking, LLC ("Parcel 44"). (Id. at 7 25, Exs. E, 
F). The property that is at issue in the present dispute is the parcel that is designated as "Curtis, 
Thomas, Dr." on Exhibit D of the Price Affidavit. (Id. at f 27, Ex. D). This property will 
hereinafter be referred to as the "Dentist Office Property." 
The Dentist Office Property was owned by Dr. Curtis, who leased it to Curtis-Klure 
PLLC. (Id. at 7 28 and Ex. G). Dr. Curtis owned a 50% interest in Curtis-Klure PLLC and Jack 
D. Klure, D.D.S. owned the other 50% interest in Curtis-Klure PLLC. (Id. at 729). The two 
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dentists operated a dentistry business out of the building located on the Dentist Office Property. 
(Id.). 
Dr. Klure did not own any interest in Parcel 44 or 45, nor did he own any interest in the 
building identified as the portion of Parcel 46 that is colored in yellow in the photograph attached 
as Exhbit D to the Price Affidavit. (Id. at 7 31, Ex. D). As illustrated by the photograph 
attached as Exhibit D, no part of the Dentist Office Property was required for the Project. (Id. at 
7 32, Ex. D). The 1 %foot wide strip of land needed for the Project ran along the front of the 
Dentist Office Property and did not encroach upon or otherwise physically touch any portion of 
i 
the Dentist Office Property. (Id.% The size and scope of the strip of land needed for the Project 
was such that if only that property were purchased by ACHD or otherwise condemned through 
ACHD's powers of eminent domain, no portion of the Dentist Office Property would be touched 
or physically affected by the acquisition. (Id at 7 33, Ex. D)(Dr. Curtis, as the owner of the 
Dentist Office Property, and Dr. Curtis and Dr. Klure, as the tenants, could still use the Dentist 
Office Property and their dentistry business could still continue to operate. (Id. at 7 33). 
ACHD initially contacted Dr. Curtis in January 2006 in an attempt to negotiate agreeable 
terms for ACHD to purchase the strip of land needed for the Project. (Id. at 'T[ 34). Specifically, 
ACHD sought to acquire those portions of property located in Parcels 44,45, and 46 that are 
identified in Exhibit D, which do not include any portion of the Dentist Office Property. (Id.). 
Because ACHD did not require any portion of the Dentist Office Property for the Project, ACHD 
did not contact Dr. Curtis about t h s  particular parcel and it did not contact Dr. Klure. (Id.). 
Early on in the negotiations, Dr. Curtis expressed a desire to have ACHD purchase his 
entire property and property interests, rather than just the small strip of property necessary for the 
Project, meaning that Dr. Curtis requested that ACHD purchase all of his interest in Parcels 44, 
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45 and 46, including all of the Dentist Office Parcel. (Id. at 7 37). ACHD did not need or 
require the additional property for the Project, and could not have acquired it through its powers 
of eminent domain. (Id. at 7 38); Idaho Code 7-704(2). But since ACHD was acting as a 
purchaser of property, and not as a condemnor of property, it agreed to consider purchasing all of 
Dr. Curtis's property interests in Parcels 44,45, and 46, instead of just the small strip of land 
needed for the Project. (Id. at 7 39). 
During the negotiations between ACHD and Dr. Curtis, it became apparent that despite 
the progress being made, a final agreement was not going to be completed before ACHD needed 
to begin construction on the Project. (Id. at 7 42). Therefore, in order to accommodate ACHD's 
construction schedule, ACHD discussed with Dr. Curtis, through his attorney, the possibility of 
an arrangement whereby ACHD could acquire possession of the strip of land necessary for the 
Project so that construction could commence pending a final agreement for the purchase of the 
entire Property. (Id. at 1 42). 
After some negotiations, ACHD and Dr. Curtis reached an agreement that would allow 
for ACHD to begin construction of the Project while the parties continued their negotiations. On 
November 10,2006, ACIFD and Dr. Curtis executed a Right-of-Entry Agreement. (Id. at 7 43, 
Ex. I). Under the Right-of-Entry Agreement, the parties specifically acknowledged that they 
were in negotiations for the purchase of the Property and that they contemplated reaching a 
purchase agreement whereby ACHD would purchase all of Dr. Curtis's interest in Parcels 44,45, 
and 46. (Id. at $/ 44, Ex. I, Section 1,v 1.2). The Agreement also acknowledged that it was 
important that the construction activities not cause any disruption or interference with Dr. 
Curtis's use of the Dentist Office Property or his and Dr. Klure's dentistry business that was 
operating in the building located on the Dentist Office Property. (Id. at 7 45, Ex. I, Section 2). 
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The property that was the subject of the Right-of-Entry Agreement did not include any 
portion of the Dentist Office Property. (Id. at 46). It only included those portions of Parcels 
44,45, and 46 that are identified on Exhibit D as being necessary for the Project. (Id.). 
At no time during ACHD's negotiations or construction of the Project did ACHD seek to 
condemn Dr. Curtis's property or property interests in Parcels 44,45, and 46 or otherwise 
exercise its powers of eminent domain. (Id. at Sj 47). Additionally, ACHD actions - either 
through its negotiations or its construction of the Project - did not interfere with Dr. Curtis's or 
Dr. Klure's use of the Dentist Office Property or their business operations on that property. 
Dr. Curtis and Dr. Klure remained in the property and continued to operate their dentistry 
businesses long after ACHD had begun its work on the Project. (Id. at 71 62, 63, 70). Their use 
- 
of the property and their ability to continue their business operations were not impaired by the 
construction of the Project or by ACHD's negotiations for the purchase of the subject property. 
(Id. ) . 
In its negotiations with Dr. Curtis, ACHD followed its right-of-way acquisition policies 
and sought negotiation in good faith to reach a fair market price for the purchase of his interests 
in Parcels 44,45 and 46 (including the Dentist Office Property). (Id. at 7 49). After more than a 
year of arms-length negotiations, on June 22,2007, ACHD and Dr. Curtis then formalized a 
settlement agreement wherein ACHD would purchase Dr. Curtis's interests in Parcels 44,45, 
and 46 (including the Dentist Office Property), and Dr. Curtis would release any claims that he 
might have against ACHD. (Id. at 71 49-50, Ex. J). By reaching the settlement agreement with 
Dr. Curtis for the purchase of his Property, ACHD accomplished its goal of acquiring property 
by agreement, rather than through condemnation. (Id. at '7 51, Ex. A). 
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Plaintiffs Dr. Klure, D.D.S. and his interest in Curtis-Klure, PLLC originally owned a 
leasehold interest in the Dentist Office Property. (Id. at f 53, Ex. G). Dr. Klure did not own any 
interest in any of the property required for the Project. (Id. at 7 55). He only owned a leasehold 
interest in the Dentist Office Property, which was not property required for the Project. (Id, at $/ 
55, Ex. G). 
ACHD did not enter into any negotiations with Dr. Klure because he did not own any 
interest or rights in the property that was required for the Project. (Id. at f 56). ACHD's 
negotiations for the purchase of Dr. Curtis's interest in Parcels 44 and 45 did not involve Dr. 
Klure because he did not own any interest in either of these parcels, and ACHD did not involve 
Dr. Klure in its negotiations to purchase the Dentist Office Property (Parcel 46) because ACHD 
only sought to buy the fee interest of the Dentist Office Property and not the leasehold interests. 
(Id. at f 5 7). 
During ACHD7s negotiations with Dr. Curtis and before it entered into the settlement 
agreement with Dr. Curtis, Dr. Klure terminated his partnership with Dr. Curtis. (Id. at f 58). 
Additionally, during that same time Dr. Klure's leasehold interest in the Dentist Office Property 
was either terminated or relinquished. (Id..). ACHD's settlement agreement with Dr. Curtis 
included a specific provision in their settlement agreement confirming these facts by which Dr. 
Curtis warranted that as of the date of the agreement, June 22,2007, Dr. Klure no longer owned 
any interest in the Property and that the lease agreement between Dr. Curtis and Dr. Klure had 
been terminated. (Id. at 'l/'JI 59-60, Ex. J, Section H). Dr. Klure signed the Settlement Agreement 
and thereby approved of and signed off on all of its terms and provisions, including the 
provisions in Section H stating that he no longer had any interest in the Property and that his 
leasehold interest had terminated. (Id. at 61, Ex. J). 
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At no time did Dr. Klure ever own any property interest in the property that was 
necessary for the Project. (Id. at tj  64). And as of June 22,2007, Dr. Klure no longer had any 
property rights or interest in the Dentist Office Property. (Id. at 7 64). Additionally, ACHD did 
not acquire Dr. Curtis's property or any adjacent property through the exercise of its eminent 
domain power conferred under Title 7, Chapter 7 of the Idaho Code, and its actions have not 
amounted to a taking of Plaintiffs' property for which they would be entitled to compensation. 
(Id. at tjf 65-70). 
111. ARGUMENT 
A. The Court's Determination of Whether a Taking has Occurred is Appropriate on 
Summary Judgment. 
Under the well-established rules for summary judgment, the granting of the motion is 
only appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on file show that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." KilZinger v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322,324-25, 17 P.3d 266,268- 
69 (2000); see also Brown v. City of Twin Falls, 124 Idaho 39,41, 855 P.2d 876, 878 (1993); 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). In making such a determination, the Court is to liberally construe the 
facts and existing record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and draw 
all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. See Killinger, 135 Idaho at 325, 
17 P.3d at 269. 
As the party moving for summary judgment, Plaintiffs bear the initial burden of 
establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Iizc., 
141 Idaho 245,250, 108 P.3d 392,397 (2005); Levinger v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 139 Idaho 192, 195, 
75 P.3d 1202, 1205 (2003); Idaho R.Civ. P. 56(c). It is only when Plaintiffs make their required 
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showing, that the burden shifts to ACHD as the non-moving party to come forward and show 
that a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements does exist. Id. 
Within the context of an eminent domainlcondemnation proceeding, all issues are to be 
resolved by the trial court, with the single exception of the issue of the amount of just 
compensation, which is to be determined by the jury. Covington v. Jeffson County, 137 Idaho 
777,780,53 P.3d 828,83 1 (2002). Among the issues for resolution by the Court are the issues 
presented by Plaintiffs' motion: whether a "taking" has occurred, when the "taking" occurred, 
and the nature of the property interest that was taken. Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass 'n, 140 
Idaho 536, 542,96 P.3d 637,643 (2004); Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667,670,603 
P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979); Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,222-23, 596 P.2d 75,94-95 (1979). 
These elements are foundational to Plaintiffs' claim for damages as the result of a "taking," since 
Plaintiffs may not maintain such an action "unless there has actually been a taking of his or her 
property." KMST LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577,581,67 P.3d 56,60 (2003). 
Where these issues are to be determined by the Court, they are proper for resolution on a 
motion for summary judgment. Reisenauer v. State, 120 Idaho 36,41,813 P.2d 375,380 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment against landowner and 
concluding there had been no taking of landowners' property by the State); Brown, 124 Idaho at 
44, 855 P.2d at 881 (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment against landowner on 
grounds that State's actions did not amount to a taking as a matter of law). 
Applying the appropriate standards for summary judgment, Plaintiffs' motion should be 
denied for the reasons that (1) there is no independent cause of action for business damages 
under Idaho Code Ij 7-7 1 1, (2) and therefore Plaintiffs7 claims must be brought as an inverse 
condemnation action, and (3) Plaintiffs cannot maintain an inverse condemnation claim because 
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they have failed to establish that they have a cornpensable property interest or that their interest 
has been "taken" by ACHD. 
B. Idaho Code 5 7-711(2) Does Not Provide for An Independent Cause of Action for the 
Recovery of Business Damages, and Plaintiffs Cannot Recover Damages Under its 
Provisions Absent an Eminent Domain Proceeding - Either Direct or Inverse. 
In their motion for summary judgment, as well as in their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek to 
recover business damages under Idaho Code 5 7-71 1 in the absence of an eminent domain 
proceeding-either a direct condemnation action initiated by ACHD or an inverse condemnation 
action filed by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs suggest that Idaho Code 5 7-71 1 creates its own independent 
cause of action-separate and apart from any eminent domain proceeding-and that to recover 
business damages under its provisions, Plaintiffs need only establish (1) that they have operated 
a business on the subject property for more than five years, and (2) that the business was either 
owned by the party whose property is being condemned or located upon the lands adjacent to the 
property being acquired. (Pla. Mem. p. 4-5). Plaintiffs' argument ignores the constitutionally- 
based and long-established mechanism for the orderly resolution of taking disputes and is 
without basis or support in law. 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, 
which was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), provides: "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation." U.S. Const., Amend. V; KMST, 138 Idaho at 580, 67 P.3d at 59. 
Similarly, Article I, 14 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho provides: "Private property 
may be taken for public use, but not until a just compensation, to be ascertained in the manner 
prescribed by law, shall be paid therefore." Idaho Const. Art I, 5 14. 
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Idaho's constitutional "takings" provision has been deemed to be "self-executing" such 
that "[nlo action by the legislature further than providing the procedural machinery by which the 
right may be applied is necessary." Payette Lakes Water and Sewer Dist. v. Hays, 103 Idaho 
717, 719,653 P.2d 438,440 (1982) (quoting Bassett v. Swensen, 51 Idaho 256,263,5 P.2d 722, 
725 (1931)). Thus, the rights that are provided for by Article 1, 9 14 "are granted, not by the 
legislature, but by the Constitution." Rueth, 100 Idaho at 21 7, 596 P.2d at 89 (1 978). However, 
the Constitution contemplates that the legislature will establish the "manner" in which recourse 
may be had for the recovery of just compensation for a taking of private property. Idaho Const. 
Art. I, 5 14. 
In carrying out its charge to establish the procedures for obtaining the constitutional 
protections of Article I, Section 14, the Idaho Legislature provided for a special set of 
proceedings for eminent domain cases and enacted those statutory provisions as Title 7, Chapter 
7 of the Idaho Code. Rueth, 100 Idaho at 220,596 P.2d at 92 ("The procedures for eminent 
domain actions have been established by the legislature.") (citing Idaho Code, Title 7, Chapter 
7)); Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170, 183,213 P.2d 91 1, 919 (1950) ("The method by which 
private property can be taken for a public use has been provided for by the legislature. Sec. 7- 
707, I.C. An assessment of damages is provided for by Sec. 7-71 1, I.C."). This statutory 
framework establishes the procedural worlungs for an eminent domain proceeding. Ada County 
Highway Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888,892,26 P.3d 1225,1229 (Ct. App. 2001) ("'The eminent 
domain proceeding is founded in the constitution . . . ."). 
In applying Idaho's constitutional and statutory provisions, Idaho Courts have recognized 
two causes of action for these constitutional rights to be exercised: a direct condemnation action, 
which is initiated by the condemning authority and an inverse condemnation action, which is 
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initiated by the landowner who claims his property has been taken without the payment of 
compensation. Sharp, 135 Idaho at 892,26 P.3d at 1229; Reisenauer, 120 Idaho at 39, 813 P.2d 
at 378 (Ct. App. 1991) ("In general, when the state wishes to acquire private property for a public 
use, it will initiate a condemnation proceeding. When the state appropriates property without 
going through the procedure of a condemnation, the property owner may initiate a suit and 
request compensation."). Thus, there are only two types of eminent domain proceedings to 
recover damages for a governmental taking of private property for public purposes-a direct 
condemnation proceeding initiated by the governmental entity or an inverse condemnation 
action. 
ACHD has provided extensive briefing on this issue in its Response to Plaintiffs' Post- 
Hearing Communication with Court Re: Motion to Dismiss filed on January 15,2008. In the 
interest of avoiding unnecessary redundancies, ACHD does not replicate that discussion here, but 
instead only summarizes the arguments made in its ~ e s ~ o n s e : '  Plaintiffs' suggestion that they 
need only establish two elements to recover business damages under Idaho's eminent domain 
statutes is without merit for the reasons that: 
(1) Idaho's business damages statute (Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2)) is part of the 
statutory framework for eminent domain proceedings and only affords damages 
within the conteKof such proceedings; 
(2) the plain language of Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2) provides that the damages are 
only recoverable in eminent domain proceedings; 
(3) the legislative history of the amendments to Idaho Code tj 7-71 1(2), which 
established the business damages provisions, provides that such damages are 
available "in eminent domain proceedings;" 
1 To the extent necessary, ACHD expressly incorporates by reference its prior arguments made 
in its Response to Plaintiffs' Post-Hearing Communication with Court Re: Motion to Dismiss if 
they were set out in full. 
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(4) the entire statutory framework for the award of damages under Idaho Code 
Title 7, Chapter 7 clearly contemplates that such damages are recoverable only 
within an eminent domain proceeding; 
(5) the complete body of Idaho eminent domain case law provides for the award 
of damages for a taking of private property within an eminent domain proceeding; 
and 
(6) the single case cited by Plaintiffs on this issue, City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 
Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 11 18 (2006), does not support their argument, but rather 
directly undermines and contradicts Plaintiffs' position. 
Thus, the appropriate mechanism to recover damages for the alleged taking of property 
by a governmental entity is either through a direct condemnation action or an inverse 
condemnation proceeding. 
In the present case, ACED has not filed an affirmative condemnation proceeding in this 
action. Therefore any claim by Plaintiffs for damages caused by an alleged taking of their 
property or any claim brought under Idaho's eminent domain statutes, of which Idaho Code 5 7- 
71 1 is a part, must be made through an inverse condemnation action. KMST, 138 Idaho at 581, 
67 P.3d at 60; Rueth, 100 Idaho at 221, 596 P.2d at 93 (1978) (citing Brock v. State Highway 
Comm 'n, 404 P.2d 934,940 (Kan. 1965). Plaintiffs' suggestion that they may ignore the 
constitutionally-based and long-established mechanism for the orderly resolution of taking 
disputes is without basis or support and should be rejected. 
C. To Recover Damages for a Taking in an Inverse Condemnation Action, Plaintiffs 
have the Burden of Proving that They have a Valid Property Interest, that ACHD's 
Actions have Risen to the Level of a Taking, and that They are Owed Just 
Compensation. 
An inverse condemnation action is "an eminent domain proceeding initiated by the 
property owner rather than the condemnor." Reisenauer, 120 Idaho at 39,813 P.2d at 378 (citing 
Rueth, 100 Idaho at 220, n. 4, 596 P.2d at 92; Wadsworth v. Department of Transp., 128 Idaho 
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439,441,915 P.2d 1 ,3  (1996)). Thus, "the principles whch affect the parties' rights in an 
inverse condemnation suit are the same as those in an eminent domain action." Id. 
The requisite elements to support a claim of inverse condemnation are as follows: 
The action must be: (1) instituted by a property owner who (2) 
asserts that his property, or some interest therein, has been invaded 
or appropriated (3) to the extent of a taking, (4) but without due 
process of law, and (5) without payment ofjust compensation. 
Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 780, 53 P.3d 828,831 (2002); City of Lewiston v. 
Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851, 856, 853 P.2d 596,601 (Ct.App. 1993). Of these elements, the Idaho 
Courts have made it clear that "[aln inverse condemnation action cannot be maintained unless 
an actual taking of private property is established." Covington, 137 Idaho at 780, 53 P.3d at 
831 (citing Snyder v. State, 92 Idaho 175, 179,438 P.2d 920, 924 (1968)) (emphasis added). 
The differences between an affirmative condemnation and an inverse condemnation 
proceeding are notable. In direct or affirmative condemnation, the governmental authority files 
the condemnation proceeding, and in doing so, is required to affirmatively allege the ownership 
of the landowner and the fact of, as well as the scope and extent of, the taking. Ruetlz, 100 Idaho 
at 21 8, 596 P.2d at 90 (citing People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390 (1942)). The governrnent 
authority then seeks a determination of the Court of all issues relating to the condemnation 
action, with the single exception of the amount of compensation owed, which is a decision for 
the jury. Rueth, 100 Idaho at 218, 596 P.2d at 90; Covingto~z, 137 Idaho at 780, 53 P.3d at 831. 
By contrast, in an inverse condemnation action, the lawsuit is initiated by the landowner, 
who assumes the burden of alleging and proving the elements that are otherwise acknowledged 
in a direct condemnation. Specifically, the landowner has the burden of proving that he has a 
valid property right and that his property right has been inhnged upon such that it constitutes a 
taking. Rueth, 100 Idaho at 21 8, 596 P.2d at 90. As recently stated by the Idaho Supreme Court 
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in M S T ,  LLC v. County of Ada, "[tlhe property owner cannot maintain an inverse 
condemnation action unless there has actually been a taking of his or her property." KMST, 138 
Idaho at 581,67 P.3d at 60. The issues of the nature of the property interest alleged to have been 
taken and whether a taking has occurred are matters of law to be resolved by the trial court. 
Moon, 140 Idaho at 542, 96 P.3d at 643; Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 670, 603 P.2d at 1004. 
As discussed below, Plaintiffs' business damages claim must fail because they cannot, 
and have not, established any of the threshold elements for an inverse condemnation claim.2 
Plaintiffs have not shown that they have a cognizable property interest in the subject property or 
that there was a taking of their property by ACHD. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment is properly denied. 
D. Plaintiffs Do Not Have a Compensable Property Interest for which They Can 
Recover Business Damages under jj 7-711(2). 
In order to recover business damages under 5 7-7 1 1 (2), or any other type of damages in 
an inverse condemnation action, Plaintiffs have the burden of proving that they have a 
compensable property right or interest. Rueth, 100 Idaho at 218,596 P.2d at 90 ("the property 
owner assumes the burden of alleging and proving his property right and the infringement 
thereof '). Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their burden because Plaintiffs do not have a 
compensable property rights and therefore cannot maintain a claim for inverse condemnation. 
Covington, 137 Idaho at 780, 53 P.3d at 831 ("[aln inverse condemnation action cannot be 
maintained urzless an actual taking of private property is established.") 
Plaintiffs state in their memorandum in support of summary judgment that they have filed a 
Motion to Amend in which they seek leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to add a claim 
for inverse condemnation. However, ACHD has not received any Motion to Amend by Plaintiffs 
and is not aware of any such Motion having been filed. 
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In an attempt to satisfy their burden of establishtng the existence of a compensable 
property right, Plaintiffs point to their leasehold interest in the subject property and claim that 
this interest is a recognized property interest for purposes of a takings claim. (Pla. Mem. p. 9- 
10). Generally speaking, ACHD does not disagree that a valid and existing leasehold interest is 
recognized as property interest that may be taken and for which compensation is to be paid when 
it is taken. State ex rel. Symms v. Nelson Sand & Gravel, Inc., 93 Idaho 574, 581,468 P.2d 306, 
3 13 (1970). However, Plaintiffs are not entitled to any such compensation because they do not 
own any property interest in the property sought to be acquired by ACHD as part of the Project. 
Plaintiffs did not at any time relevant to this action own any interest in Parcel 44 or 45, 
nor did they own any interest in the portion of Parcel 46 that was required for the Project. (Price 
Aff. 7 3 1,55). Additionally, no part of the Dentist Office Property was required for the Project 
and no portion of the 13-foot wide strip of land needed for the Project physically touched or 
required any portion of the property in which Plaintiffs owned a leasehold interest. (Id. at 32,33, 
55, 57). In Idaho, for a property owner to be entitled to compensation under Article I, Section 14 
of Idaho's Constitution, "his property must be "taken" and not merely "damaged." Moon, 140 
Idaho at 541,96 P.3d 637 at 642; Covington, 137 Idaho at 781,53 P.3d at 832. And here, where 
not a single inch of the Dentist Office Property was necessary for the Project and therefore could 
not be "taken" as part of the project, Plaintiffs cannot establish the requisite elements to maintain 
an inverse condemnation action. Moreover, to the extent that ACED acquired the fee property 
underlying their leasehold interest, that acquisition was the result ACED'S purchase of the 
property and not due to a "taking." (Price Aff. 77 65-69). 
In addition to not having any property interest in the property necessary for the Project, 
Plaintiffs also have failed to establish that they had a compensable property interest because they 
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relinquished or otherwise lost their property rights in the Dentist Office Property on or before the 
date that ACHD purchased the property. (Id. 'Ijfilj 58-60, Ex. J); see Plaintiffs' Complaint tj 11. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge this fact in their Complaint when they stated that they voluntarily decided 
to terminate their partnership with Dr. Curtis and relocate their business. Plaintiffs' Complaint 1 
1 1 ("Klure's decision to relocate required that Klure and Curtis sever their long-term business 
relationship at Maple Grove."); see also Klure Affidavit 'Ij 7 (Aug. 5,2008). Thus, by Plaintiffs' 
own admission, they voluntarily vacated the Dentist Office Property and decided to relocate their 
business. In doing so, they "severed" their business relationship with Dr. Curtis and terminated 
their interests in the Dentist Office Property. And without a property interest, they have no basis 
for an inverse condemnation action. 
Whatever date they may have relinquished their interest and rights in the subject 
Property, there is no question that Plaintiffs no longer had any compensable property interest as 
of the date ACHD purchased the Dentist Office Property. Under the express terms of the 
settlement agreement between ACHD and Dr. Curtis, Dr. Curtis represented and warranted to 
ACHD that as of June 22,2007, Dr. Klure, who had leased and shared office space with Dr. 
Curtis no longer had any ownership interest in the property. (Price Aff., 'Ijtj 58-59, Ex. J, 
Settlement Agreement, f H). Additionally, as of that date, the lease agreement had been 
terminated-a fact which was similarly warranted by Dr. Curtis in the settlement agreement. (Id. 
filj 60, Ex. G). 
As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in State ex rel. Symms v. Nelson Sand & Gravel, 
Inc., "lilt is well settled [ . . . ] that the owner of land at the time of the condemnation is the party 
entitled to compensation for the talung. Id. at 578,468 P.2d at 310; see State ex rel. Symms v. 
City ofMountain Home, 94 Idaho 528, 532,493 P.2d 387,391 (1972). And here, Plaintiffs no 
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longer had any interest in the Dentist Office Property as of the date of, if not before, the 
settlement agreement between ACHD and Dr. Curtis was executed on June 22,2007. Thus, 
without any compensable property interest, Plaintiffs cannot maintain an action for inverse 
condemnation. KMST, 13 8 Idaho at 5 80-8 1,67 P.3d at 59-60 (holding that a "property owner 
cannot maintain an inverse condemnation action unless there has actually been a taking of his or 
herproperty" and ); Brown, 124 Idaho at 41,855 P.2d at 878 (affirming grant of summary 
judgment on inverse condemnation claim in favor of City based upon absence of existing, 
compensable property right); see Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding 
that a mining company could not recover compensation for the period of time after it had 
voluntarily given up a leasehold interest in the litigated property). 
E. There has been no "Taking" of Plaintiffs' Property that Would Entitle Plaintiffs to 
an Award of Business Damages. 
In addition to Plaintiffs' failure to satisfy their burden of establishing a compensable 
property interest, they also have failed to establish that a "taking" has occurred. The question of 
whether a taking has occurred is "a threshold issue that must be established before an inverse 
condemnation action can be maintained." KMST, 138 Idaho at 582,67 P.3d at 61; Covington, 137 
Idaho at 780, 53 P.3d at 831 (quoting Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 670,603 P.2d at 1004). Plaintiffs have 
failed to establish that a taking has occurred as a result of ACHD's actions in this case. 
In support of their takings argument, Plaintiffs assert that a taking occurred as a result of 
ACHD's purchase and possession of the Dentist Office Property belonging to Dr. Curtis. 
According to Plaintiffs, ACHD's purchase of this property on June 22,2007 triggered the 
Condemnation Clause of their Lease Agreement, which caused their lease with Dr. Curtis to 
terminate. (Pla. Mem. p. 10- 1 1). Thus, Plaintiffs' argument is that the "taking" by ACHD 
occurred on June 22,2007. Plaintiffs' argument fails for several reasons. 
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1. Plaintiffs Did Not Own Any Property Interest That Was Necessary For the 
Project and Without Any Such Property, No Taking of That Property Could 
Have, or Did Occur. 
First, as discussed above, no taking of Plaintiffs' property could have occurred, because 
they had no property interest in the strip of land that was necessary for the Project. By law, 
ACHD can only "take" property to the extent that it is "necessary" for a particular project. Idaho 
Code 5 7-704(2); (Price Aff. 11 38,67). Here, the only property that was "necessary" for the 
Project was the 30-foot wide strip of land running adjacent to Ustick Road. (Id. at flSj 20-25, Exs. 
C, D). This property did not include any of the property within the boundaries of the Dentist 
Office Property. (Id. 7 32). Thus, where the Dentist Office Property was not "necessary" for the 
Project ACHD did not have the authority to acquire the property through its powers of eminent 
domain. Idaho Code 5 7-704(4); (Price Aff. 11 38,67). This is why ACHD had to purchase the 
Dentist Office Property - like any other market participant - and had to negotiate an agreed-upon 
purchase price for the property. In doing so, ACHD did not, and could not, "take" the Property 
under its powers of eminent domain. 
Moreover, no taking of Plaintiffs' property would have occurred even if ACHD did 
"take" the property that was required for the Project, because no portion of the Dentist Office 
Property would have been touched or physically affected by the Project. And, under Idaho law, 
absent a physical taking, there is no grounds for compensation. Moon, 140 Idaho at 541,96 P.3d 
637 at 642; Covington, 137 Idaho at 781,53 P.3d at 832. 
Additionally, no taking of the Dentist Office Property could have or did occur because 
ACHD, like any other governmental entity seeking to exercise its powers of eminent domain, 
must obtain an Order of Condemnation. Idaho Code 5 7-702(6); (Price Aff. 7 68). An Order of 
Condemnation is an official resolution by the ACHD Commission identifying the property rights 
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necessary for and to be acquired as part of the Project. (Id.). Here, the ACHD Commission 
never issued such an Order, therefore ACHD did not have the authority to initiate or maintaining 
a condemnation action. (Id.). Again, t h s  is why ACKDpurchased the Dentist Office Property 
through a negotiated agreement-because it did not have the authority to acquire it through its 
powers of eminent domain. 
2. ACHD's Purchase of the Property Does Not Amount to a "Taking" Because 
As of the Date ACHD took Possession of the Property, Plaintiffs No Longer 
Had Any Interest in the Property. 
Second, no taking of Plaintiffs' property could have occurred on June 22,2007 because 
Plaintiffs did not own any interest or rights in the Dentist Office Property as of that date. 
According to the express terms of the agreement between ACHD and Dr. Curtis, as of June 22, 
2007, Dr. Klure "no longer had any ownership interest in the property," and the lease agreement 
had been terminated. (Price Aff., l f j  49, 50, 52, 54 and Ex. J, Settlement Agreement, f j  H). 
Important to note is that Dr. Klure signed the Settlement Agreement and thereby approved of and 
signed off on all of its terms and provisions, including the provisions in Section H stating that he 
no longer had any interest in the Dentist Office Property and that his leasehold interest had 
terminated. (Id. 1 51 and Ex. J, Settlement Agreement, 7 H). As a signatory to the agreement, 
Dr. Klure is bound by its terms. Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946,959-60,8 12 
P.2d 253,266-67 (1991) (Bistline, J., concurring) ("The parties are all bound by the terms of the 
negotiated lease agreement to which they affixed their signature, and it should be so held."). 
Thus, where Plaintiffs did not own any property rights, they are unable to support or maintain a 
claim for the taking of those rights. KMST, 138 Idaho at 582,67 P.3d at 61. 
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3. ACHD Has Not Affirmatively Exercised its Powers of Eminent Domain to 
"Take" the Subject Property so As to Trigger the Condemnation Clause of 
Plaintiffs' Lease Agreement. 
Thlrd, the triggering events for the Condemnation Clause have never occurred such that 
Plaintiffs cannot seek any relief under its provisions. The Condemnation Clause in the Lease 
Agreement provides that: 
14.1 Entire or Substantial Taking. If the entire Premises or so 
much thereof as to make the balance not reasonably adequate for 
the conduct of Tenant's business notwithstanding restoration by 
Landlord hereinafter provided, shall be taken under the power of 
eminent domain, this Lease shall automatically terminate as of the 
date on which condemning authority takes title or possession, 
whichever first occurs. 
Lease Agreement, Art. 14.1 (emphasis added). The Condemnation Clause addresses what is to 
occur as between Dr. Curtis and Dr. Klure in the event of a taking of the Dentist Office Property 
under the power of eminent domain. Id. As discussed above, with respect to its purchase of the 
Dentist Office Property, ACHD has not and could not exercise its power of eminent domain to 
acquire that property, so therefore it has not effected a "taking." Absent a "taking" of the Dentist 
Office Property by ACHD, the Condemnation Clause is not triggered and is therefore not a 
legitimate basis to support Plaintiffs' argument. 
4. No "Taking" Occurred as a Result of ACHD's Negotiations with Dr. Curtis 
for the Purchase of the Property. 
Fourth, the agreement reached between ACHD and Dr. Curtis was a negotiated, arms- 
length transaction for the purchase of the Dentist Office Property and did not amount to a taking. 
See City ofLewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851,858,853 P.2d 596,603 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Throughout its discussions and negotiations for the purchase of Dr. Curtis's property, ACHD 
was engaged in the required "negotiation" stage of its acquisition processes, and ACHD never 
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proceeded to a condemnation or takings phase in its dealings with Dr. Curtis andlor Dr. Klure. 
(Price Aff. 1 69). 
The City of Lewiston v. Lindsey is particularly instructive on this issue. In Lindsey, the 
Court concluded that the City of Lewiston had caused a taking of the landowners' property 
because it had never interfered with the owner's use of the property before the commencement of 
the condemnation proceedings. Lindsey, 123 Idaho at 858,853 P.2d at 603. The Court reached 
this conclusion despite the fact that the City had (1) passed a resolution declaring its intention to 
proceed with a street improvement project, (2) designed the project and prepared right-of-way 
plans, (3) identified the particular parcels required for the project, (4) commenced acquisition 
processes, (5) began negotiations with the landowner, and (6) advised the landowner that the 
project was imminent. Id. at 852-53,853 P.2d at 597-98. For the Court, the important inquiry 
was whether there was any interference with the owner's use of the property, and so long as the 
landowner could still use the property, the Court concluded that there was no taking. Id. 
Applying the principles of Lindsey to the instant case, there has been no taking as a result 
of ACHD's negotiations and attempts to purchase the Dentist Office Property, since ACHD did 
not interfere with either Dr. Curtis's or Dr. Klure's use of the property. Evidence of the lack of 
any interference with Dr. Curtis and Dr. Klure's use of the Dentist Office Property or ability to 
continue their business operations lies in the fact that both Dr. Klure and Dr. Curtis continued to 
access, work at, and maintain their business operations on the Dentist Office Property despite 
ACHD's construction work on the Project. (Price Aff. 71 62-63'69-70). The construction work 
on the portions of Parcels 44,45, and 46 required for the Project began as of the date of the 
I \,' 1 
W '  
Right-of-Entry Agreement in November 2007. Yet, Dr. Klure did not leave the property until 
- -. I__ --..- /-' 
April 2007 and Dr. Curtis did not leave until June 2007, (Id., Ex. I). Thus, the mere fact that 
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both dentists were able to continue their businesses after the Project construction began requires 
the conclusion that there was no interference with their use of the property and therefore no 
"taking." Lindsey, 123 Idaho at 858, 853 P.2d at 603. 
Consistent with the Court's decision in Lindsey, numerous other jurisdictions have 
similarly concluded that mere negotiations by a governmental entity to purchase property does 
not amount to a taking: 
Stahelin v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Du Page County, 877 N.E.2d 1 121, 1 13 1 (111. 
2007) ("the 'taking of land by eminent domain ' is not accomplished by passing 
resolutions or ordinances or by negotiating with the owners for thepurchase of it 
or by serving notice to the owner that land may be required for public purposes.") 
(quoting Eckhoffv. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County, 36 N.E.2d 245,248 
(Ill. 1941)) (emphasis added); 
Ferrari v. US., 73 Fed.Cl. 219,225 (2006) (negotiations between the government 
and a landowner, including a failed negotiations "is not enough to constitute a 
taking) (emphasis added); 
Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("Negotiation of 
a possible future event may state a hope and a plan, but it is not a fuced, ripe, and 
compensable taking.") (emphasis added); 
Additionally, since ACHD is required to negotiate in good faith with a landowner to purchase 
property, it cannot initiate or successfully maintain a condemnation action until it satisfies this 
requirement. Idaho Code 5 7-707(7) (Price Aff. 7 69). All of its discussions and negotiations 
with Dr. Curtis were for thepurchase of the Dentist Office Property and his interest in Parcels 
44 and 45 and not as part of the exercise of ACHDys powers of eminent domain. 
Accordingly, there has been no taking by ACHD in this matter as a result of their negotiations 
and agreement with Dr. Curtis for the purchase of his property. 
F. There has Been No "Sale Under Threat of Condemnation" That Amounts to A 
Taking. 
Plaintiffs next cite to Article 14.4 of their Lease Agreement to suggest that ACHD 
actions amount to a "taking" of the subject property as a result of its purchase of Dr. Curtis' 
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property. Article 14.4 of the Lease Agreement provides that "[a] sale by Landlord of the Premise 
either under threat of condemnation or while condemnation proceedings are pending, shall be 
deemed a taking under the power of eminent domain for all purposes of this section." (Pla. 
Mem. p. 1 1). While not expressly stated, it appears that Plaintiffs' argument under this provision 
is that the sale of Dr. Curtis's property to ACHD was made under threat of condemnation, which 
therefore would trigger the Condemnation Clause of the Lease Agreement. 
Plaintiffs make no argument nor do they present any evidence to suggest that there was 
any threat of condemnation during the negotiation process between ACHD and Dr. Curtis and 
therefore have failed to meet their burden on summary judgment on this issue. On summary 
judgment, Plaintiffs, as the moving party, bear the initial burden of establishing the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact on the challenged issue. Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 141 
Idaho 245,250, 108 P.3d 392,397 (2005) (citing Levinger v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 139 Idaho 192, 
195,75 P.3d 1202, 1205 (2003); Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Having failed to meet their burden on 
summary judgment, the burden does not shft to ACHD, as the non-moving party, to come 
forward and show that a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements does exist. Id. 
Despite having failed to satisfy their burden, the merits of Plaintiffs' arguments must fail 
because ACHD's negotiations for the purchase of the Dentist Office Property were not made 
under "threat of condemnation." No such threat was ever made during any discussions or 
negotiations with ACHD. (Price Aff. tj 65). Additionally, there was no "threat of 
condemnation" because ACHD can only condemn property if it has an Order of Condenmation 
that identifies the property rights being taken (Idaho Code 5 7-707(6)), and ACHD's 
Commissioners had not issued any such Order of Condemnation for the strip of property that was 
necessary for the Project or for any portion of the Dentist Office Property. (Price Aff, 7 68). 
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There was also no "threat of condemnation" with respect to the entire piece of property 
belonging to Dr. Curtis, since ACHD can only condemn property that is "necessary" for the 
Project (Idaho Code 5 7-704(2)), and Dr. Curtis's entire property was not "necessary" to 
complete the construction of the Project. (Price Aff. 7 67). Therefore ACHD could not threaten 
to condemn property that it did not have the authority to condemn. 
G. Plaintiffs are Also Not Entitled to Business Damages Under fj 7-711(2) Because 
Their Business can be, and has been, Relocated. 
Alternatively, if it is determined that Plaintiffs did in fact have a compensable property 
interest and that a taking has occurred, Plaintiffs are still not entitled to recover business 
damages. Section 7-7 1 l(2) only permits an award of business damages if the losses can 
reasonably be prevented by the relocation of the business. Here, Plaintiffs have relocated their 
business and thereby prevented any business losses that might have occurred as the result of 
ACHD's  action^.^ Therefore, they are not entitled to any award of business damages under 7- 
7 1 l(2). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' motion is properly denied on the grounds Plaintiffs do not own a compensable 
property interest, and there has been no "taking" of their property. Additionally, Plaintiffs can 
only recover business damages if they are unable to relocate their business, and here Plaintiffs 
not only can, but have, successfully relocated their business. As such, Plaintiffs may not recover 
business damages pursuant to Idaho Code 8 7-7 1 l(2). For these reasons, ACHD respectfiilly 
requests Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment be denied. 
Plaintiffs originally sought reimbursement for their relocation expenses as part of the current 
action. However, the Court has dismissed those claims on procedural grounds as being not 
properly presented in the present case. Plaintiffs have not sought to otherwise raise those claims 
in the proper forum. 
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DATED this 25th day of September, 2008. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Attorneys f+~efendaht,/ 
Ada County Highwaybistrict 
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Martin Hendrickson 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
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ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT. 
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MOTION TO AMEND 
Defendant. 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP 
and, pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 15(a), hereby move this Court for an order granting leave to file 
their First Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs' proposed First Amended Complaint is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "1" and hereby incorporated by reference. 
This motion is supported by the Memoraildurn in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment previously filed in this action. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
MOTION TO AiVIEND - 1 
Sk 
DATED this L day of October, 2008. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CB. 
I hereby certify that on the day of October, 2008, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated: 
/'- 
J. Frederick Mack 
Steven C. Bowman 
Mary V. York 
HOLLAND & HAR T LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
a U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
express mail 
[7 hand delivery 
[I facsimile 
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ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
Defendant. I 
CASE NO. CV OC 071638 1 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Plaintiffs allege: 
NATURE OF ACTION 
1. This action results from Defendant's acquisition of real property in 
conjunction with a road-widening project that forced Plaintiffs to relocate a long- 
established dental practice. Plaintiff Maple Grove seeks a declaratory ruling that it is 
entitled to seek damages from Defendant under Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2) and an award of 
such damages. Maple Grove and Klure seek damages from Defendant under Idaho Code 
5 40-2004. 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
2. Plaintiff Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba Maple Grove Dentistry ("Maple 
Grove"), is an Idaho professional limited liability company that formerly operated as a 
dental practice at 3224 North Maple Grove Road, Boise, Idaho (the "Property"), for more 
than ten (10) years. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Maple Grove was owned 
equally by Plaintiff Jack D. Klure, D.D.S. ("Klure"), and Thomas R. Curtis, D.D.S. 
("Curtis"). 
3. Plaintiff Klure is an individual engaged in the business of dentistry in 
Boise, Idaho. 
4. Defendant Ada County Highway District ("ACHD) is a body politic and 
corporate of the State of Idaho responsible for all sl~ort-range planning, construction, 
maintenance, operations, rehabilitation and in~provements to Ada County's urban streets, 
rural roadways (excluding state highways) and bridges. 
5. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Article V, Section 
20 of the Idaho Constitution, Idaho Code $5 1-701, 1-705 and other law. The Court has 
personal jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to Idaho Code tj 5-514. 
6. Venue is proper in this district under ldaho Code $ 5  5-404 and 5-515 
because the parties transact business in this district and the claims asserted herein arose in 
this district. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
7. ACHD is implementing a road improvement project in Boise, Idaho, 
known as Ustick Road, Five Mile to Cole Project-Project No. 504004 (the "Project"). 
8. The Project required the acquisition of property along Ustick Road, 
including portions of real property operated by Maple Grove as a dental practice. 
9. At all times relevant to the Complaint, Curtis owned the Property, and 
Maple Grove leased the Property for its dental practices. 
10. Prior to ACHD's acquisition of the Property, Maple Grove had been in 
business at the Property's location for over ten (10) years. 
11. When ACHD announced the Project and its intention to acquire a portion 
of Curtis's property, Klure determined it would be necessary to relocate his dental 
practice due to ACHD's poor reputation and the restricted access to the site that would 
remain when the Project was completed. Ultimately, Klure's decision to relocate 
required that Klure and Curtis sever their long-term business relationship at Maple 
Grove. 
12. In June 2007, Curtis entered into a settlement agreement with ACHD for 
just compensation for the fee interest in the Property it was acquiring in connection with 
the Project and for Curtis's fifty percent (50%) interest in Maple Grove (the 
"ACHD/Curtis Settlement"). 
13. Klure did not benefit from the ACHDICurtis Settlement; the agreement 
specifically reserved any claims for compensation for damages to Klure or his fifty 
percent (50%) interest in Maple Grove. 
14. Maple Grove attempted to negotiate a settlement with ACHD for the 
damages Klure's interest in Maple Grove suffered as a result of ACHD's decision to 
acquire the Property, but ACHD refused to compensate Maple Grove for any damages 
the Project caused Klure or his interest in Maple Grove. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION-DECLARATORY JUDGEMENT AND DAMAGES 
15. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate as though fully set forth herein 
paragraphs 1 though 14 above. 
16. Idaho Code 4 7-71 l(2) provides for the assessment of business damages 
that are reasonably caused by the taking of land upon which the business is located. To 
be eligible for 5 7-71 l(2) business damages, the business must have more than five (5) 
years standing and either be owned by the party whose lands are being condemi~ed 3 be 
located upon adjoining lands owned by the party whose lands are being condemned. id. 
17. Prior to ACHD's acquisition of the Property, Maple Grove had been in 
business at the Property for over ten (1 0) years. 
18. Prior to ACHD's acquisition of the Property, Maple Grove was located 
upon adjoining lands owned by Curtis, whose property was sought to be condemned. 
19. Had Maple Grove remained in operation on the Property, it would have 
suffered business damages in excess of the cost of relocation. 
20. Maple Grove incurred business damages in the form of relocating Klure's 
practice, in an amount to be proven at trial, as a direct result of ACHD's decision to 
acquire the Property as part of the Project. 
21. Maple Grove and Klure submitted a written business damages claim lo 
ACHD, pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-71 l(i), detailing Klure's relocation costs and seeking 
reimbursement of the same. ACHD rejected Klure's demand and refused to compensate 
him for any damages associated with its acquisition of the Property. 
22. Maple Grove believes that it is legally entitled to seek and obtain damages 
under Idaho Code Ej 7-71 l(2) as a result of ACHD's acquisition of the Property. ACWD 
disagrees. Thus, an actual controversy exists between the parties regarding the 
application of Idaho Code 5 7-7 1 l(2). 
23. Maple Grove seeks a judicial declaration that it is entitled to business 
damages from ACHD as a result of the Project under Idaho Code 7-71 1(2), together 
with its reasonable costs and attorneys' fees incurred in bringing this action. 
24. In the event that the Court issues the requested declaratory judgment, 
Maple Grove requests the Court to determine damages pursuant to Idaho Code $ 7- 
71 l(2). 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION-HIGHWAY RELOCATION ASSISTANCE 
25. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate as though fully set forth herein 
paragraphs 1 though 24 above. 
26. The Highway Relocation Assistance Program set forth in Idaho Code S; 
40-2004 requires an agency that uses funds for public purposes to compensate those 
displaced by such agency for the "actual and reasonable expense" in moving their 
business, including the cost of moving personal property. 
27. ACHD is using public funds to complete the Project. 
28. Maple Grove and Klure were displaced by the Project when Klure was 
forced to move his dental business and personal property to a new location after the 
Property was conveyed to ACHD as part of the Project. 
29. Maple Grove and Klure incurred relocation damages, in an amount to be 
proven at trial, as a direct result of ACHD's decision to acquire the Property as part of the 
Project, including, but not limited to: 
a. Actual damages in the amount Klure has been required to spend to 
relocate his personal property to a new facility for his dentistry practice; 
and 
b. Actual damages in the amount Klure has been required to spend to 
construct the new facility to make it suitable for a dentistry practice. 
30. Maple Grove and Klure have demanded that ACHD reimburse its 
reasonable relocation damages caused by ACHD's acquisition of the Property, but 
ACHD has and continues to refuse to do so. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION-INVERSE CONDEMNATION 
31. Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate as though fully set forth herein 
Paragraphs 1 through 30 above. 
32. Before ACHD's acquisition of the Property, Maple Grove held a leasehold 
interest in the Property. 
33. ACHD acquired the Property to complete the Project. 
34. Pursuant to the terns of the Lease Agreement between Maple Grove and 
Curtis, upon ACHD's acquisition of the Property, Maple Grove's leasehold interest was 
terminated. Accordingly, ACHD's acquisition of the Property resulted in the taking of 
Maple Grove's leasehold interest in the Property. 
35. Under the ACHD/Curtis Settlement, ACHD compensated Curtis for, 
among other things, that portion of Maple Grove's leasehold interest attributable to his 
ownership interest in Maple Grove. 
36. However, ACHD has not paid just compensation to Klure for that portion 
of Maple Grove's leasehold interest attributable to his ownership interest in Maple Grove 
or for his business damages caused by the taking of the leasehold interest. 
JURY TRIAL DEMAND 
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court enter judgment against ACHD: 
1.  For a declaration that Maple Grove is entitled to damages froin ACHD 
under Idaho Code § 7-71 l(2) as a result of ACHD's acquisition of the 
Property for the Project; 
2. For a judgment of business andlor relocation damages pursuant to Idaho 
Code 5 7-7 1 l(2) in favor of Maple Grove; 
3.  For damages, in an amount to be proven at trial, pursuant to Idaho Code 
5 40-2004, in favor of Maple Grove andor Klure; 
4. For damages, in ail amount to be proven at trial, in favor of Maple Grove 
and/or Klure for just compensation for the taking of their property; 
5 .  For Plaintiffs' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein; and 
6. For sucli otlier and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable. 
DATED this - day of October, 2008. 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the - day of October, 2008, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing bras served upon the following individual(s) by the ineans indicated: 
J. Frederick Mack 
Steven C. Bowman 
Mary V. York 
HOLLAND & HAR T LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
[rl U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
[rl express mail 
hand delivery 
[I7 facsimile 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
GARY G. ALLEN (ISB # 4366) 
DEBORA K. KRISTENSEN (ISB #5337) 
MARTIN HENDRICKSON (ISB #5876) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701 -2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1 200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1300 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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REPLY IN SUPPORT TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUfcfMARY JUDGMENT 
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 1 
Defendant. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Sum~nary Judgment seeks this Court's ruling that they are en titled 
to business damages froin the Ada County Highway District ("ACHD") under Idaho Code $ 7- 
71 l(2). The Plaintiffs qualify for damages pursuant to that statute because they operated the 
business located on the premises for more than five (5) years and were located on property, or 
adjacent to property, that was obtained by ACHD for a public purpose. ACHD argues that 
Plaintiffs are unable to assert a claiin for business damages because Plaintiffs did not own any 
interest in the property that was necessary for the Ustick Road widening project. ACHD also 
claims that Plaintiffs' lease had been terminated prior to the date that ACHD obtained the 
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property from Dr. Curtis, and that Plaintiffs cannot recover business damages because Dr. Klure 
was able to relocate his business. 
The undisputed facts in the summary judgment record show that Plaintiffs hahe met all of 
the requirements of I.C. $ 7-711(2) and are therefore entitled to business damages. Plaintiffs 
have standing to assert their claim for business damages and qualify for such damages under the 
plain language of the statute. 111 the alternative, Plaintiffs are entitled to business damages under 
the theory of inverse condemnation based upon the taking that occurred when ACWD purchased 
the real property owned by Dr. Curtis, which effectively terminated Plaintiffs' lease. Finally, the 
measure of damages is not at issue at this time, but the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that 
business damages available under I.C. 5 7-71 l(2) may include relocation costs. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiffs Qualify for Damages Under I.C. tj 7-711(2) and Wave Standing to 
Assert a Claim Under that Statute. 
ACHD does not appear to dispute that Maple Grove meets the requirements Eor an award - 
s 
of business damages under I.C. Cj 7-71 1(2), and that Dr. Klure would be entitled to his share of 
those damages if an eminent domain proceeding had been initiated by ACHD. Instead, ACHD's 
position is that, by negotiating the purchase of Dr. Curtis' property rather than conden~ning it, 
ACHD can avoid paying Dr. Klure the coinpensation to which he is statutorily entitled. ACHD's 
interpretation of Idaho's eminent domain statute creates a right for qualifying business ouiners 
without a remedy and leaves business owners at the mercy of the condemning entity and the 
property owner. Such an interpretation co~lflicts with the clearly expressed intent of the Idaho 
Legislature which is to provide compensation to qualifying business owners who are affected by 
public takings. 
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As to Maple Grove's ability to assert its claim for damages under I.C. $ 7-71 l(2) despite 
the fact that neither ACHD nor Dr. Curtis filed an action, we need only tun1 to LC. 5 7-709. That 
section provides standing for Maple Grove to assert its claim for business damages. 
All persons in occupation of, or having or claiming an interest in, 
any of the property described in the complaint, or in the damages 
for the taking thereof, though not named, may appear, plead, and 
defend each in respect to his own property or interest, or that 
claimed by him, in like manner as if named in the complaint. 
Here, Maple Grove is a person with an interest in the damages for the taking of the 
property and therefore may "appear, plead and defend" to the same extent as if they had been 
named in a complaint. In other words, Maple Grove has the right to assert its claim under I.C. $ 
7-71 l(2) despite the fact that neither an enlinent domain nor an inverse condemnation action Mias 
brought by ACHD or Dr. Curtis. 
Maple Grove concedes that the statute does not explicitly provide for the tiling of a 
complaint by a qualifying business owner. I-fowever, the statute similarly does not provide for 
the filing of a complaint by the property owner. However, the property owner's right to initiate 
an inverse condelnnation action has been recognized repeatedly by the Idaho Supreme Court and 
is similarly recognized by ACHD in its response. See ACHD's response, pp 11-12. Maple 
Grove stands in no different position - it qualifies for damages under the eminent domain statute 
and has standing pursuant to $ 7-709. To deny Maple Grove its opportunity to assert its claim for 
damages on the ground that ACHD was able to negotiate a purchase of Dr. Curtis' property 
inserts requirements into the statute that do not exist, makes portions of I. C. 5 7-711(2) 
superfluous, and is contrary to the clearly expressed intent of the legislature to provide 
compensatioil to qualifying businesses. 
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There is no requirement in tj 7-71 l(2) or 5 7-709 that a qualifying business also own a 
portion of the property being condemned, which is precisely the requirement that ACHD seeks to 
impose. Indeed, such a requirement would contradict the plain language of those statutes. A 
business may qiialify for damages by virtue of being adjacent to the condemiled property. A 
person has standing to appear, plead, or defend by having an interest in the damages arising from 
the taking. If a qualifying business must also be an owner of the property being condemned in 
order to assert such a claim, then those portions of the statutes are unnecessary. 
Finally, there is no logical reason that the Idaho Legislature would have intended to 
condition its @ant of a right to damages to a qualifying business upon the inability of the 
government to negotiate a p~lrchase of the property. The Idaho Legislature, having provided a 
right to damages for qualifying businesses, must also be presumed to have intended those 
qualifying businesses to be able to assert their claims without having to be dependent upon an 
action brought by the government or the property owner. The Idaho Supreme Court recogni~ed 
more than ninety years ago that "if the pla~ntiff can show that the [statutory] duty was i~nposed 
for his benefit, and that the Legislati~re had in mind his protection in passing the act in question, 
and intended to give him a vested right in the discharge of that duty, then this will give him such 
an interest as will support an action." State v. Arr~erlc~tn Surety Co. ofilieu: York, 26 Idaho 652, 
671, 135 P. 1097, 1 102-03 (1914). 
Florida's eminent donlain statute is similar to Idaho's statute in that it provides for an 
award of damages to qualifying businesses. Fla.Stat. Section 73.07(3)(b). In Stcrte Dept. of 
Transp. v. Crews, 227 So.2d 505 (F1a.Dist.Ct.A~~. 1969), the court held that a lessee had an 
independent right to bring a claim for business damages despite the fact that the lessee was not a 
party to the principal action for condemnation of the property. The Florida eminent doinain - 
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statutes do not explicitly provide for the cominencement of an action by any person other then 
the government. 
The undisputed facts in the sunlniary judgment record demonstrate that Maple Grove is a 
qualifying business under I.C. 5 7-71 l(2) and has standing to plead its claims pursuant to I.C. $ 
7-709. Therefore, Maple Grove is entitled to an order granting partial summary judgment in its 
favor as to its right to recover business damages. 
B. In the Alternative, Maple Grove can Establish an Inverse Condemnation 
Claim. 
ACHD claims that Maple Grove is unable to establish the essential elements of an inverse 
condemilation claim because no taking of any of Maple Grove's property occurred. ACHD 
asserts that 1) Maple Grove's lease had terminated prior to the date that ACHD acquired Dr. 
Curtis' property; 2) ACHD did not need any of the property leased by Maple Grove for the road 
widening project; and 3) the property was acquired via negotiated purchase rather than 
condemnation or threat of condemnation. The ACHD's arguments fail for factual and legal 
reasons. 
First, as to the timing of the termination of the lease, ACWD's position is contradicted by 
the tenns of the Settlement Agreement between ACHD and Dr. Klure. Paragraph H of that 
agreement, in relevant pai-t, provides: 
Both parties understand that by this Agreement, Curtis represents 
and warrants to ACHD that upon payment by ACHD to Curtis 
provided herein, that the Curtis-Klure leases of the Office Parcel 
and the other parcels described on Exhibits A, B and C will 
terminated prior to closing. 
Affidavit of Dr. Klure, Exhibit 2, p. 4. 
ACHD convolutes this language to support its argument that the Maple Grove lease of 
Dr. Curtis' property had terminated before ACHD acquired the property. That clearly is not the 
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case. Instead, based upon the Settlement Agreement and terms of the lease itself, it was the 
"payment by ACHD" to Dr. Curtis and the transfer of the property from Dr. Curtis to ACHD that 
caused the termination of the lease. Affidavit of Dr. Klure, Exhibit 1, pp 13-14. Thus, ACHD is 
sin~ply wrong when it claims that the lease was terminated prior to the date it obtained the 
property. Instead, it terminated sinlultaneoi~sly with ACHD obtaining the property. 
In addition, any dispute concerning the precise timing of the various actions that cornprise 
the "closing" of the transaction between ACHD and Dr. Curtis is immaterial. The undisputed 
facts in the record show that the only reason that Dr. Curtis and Dr. Klure ended their 
partnership, and the only reason that the Maple Grove's lease was terminated was the acquisition 
of property by ACHD for the Ustick Road widening project. 
As to ACHD's argument that it did not need, and therefore did not take, any portion of 
the property leased by Maple Grove for the completion of the project, we need only look again to 
the Settleillent Agreement that ACHD entered into with Dr. Curtis. Therein, it states: 
WHEREAS, in connection with the Project, ACHD needs to 
acquire a portion of each of the Office Parcel, Parcel 45 and 
Parcel 44; and 
WHEREAS, ACHD has offered to purchase Curtises' interest in 
the Properties as a settlement and accommodation of all of Curtis' 
claims, both as an owner of the properties and as a fifty percent 
(50%) member of Curtis-Klure. This settlement is intended to 
resolve and forever extinguish any all claims and disputes 
between ACHD and Curtis, including their interest in Curtis- 
Klure." 
Affidavit of Dr. Klure, Exhibit 2, p. 1 (emphasis added). The legal description of the "Office 
Parcel" referenced in the Settlement Agreement is exactly the same as the description of the 
property leased by Maple Grove - Lot 19, Block 1 of Fairbanks Subdivision. Thus, ACHD 
clearly stated in the Settlement Agreement that it did in fact need a portion of the "Office Parcel" 
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in connection with the project. Any statements by ACMD to the contrary made in the context of 
this litigation must be disregarded. 
Further, Maple Grove concedes that the boundaries of the bare legal description of the 
\. ----A 
he new sidewalk and curbing for Ustick come 
within a few feet of the Maple Grove Dentistry building, which is the approximate boundary of 
the Office Parcel. However, this does not mean that the property taken by ACHD and actually 
used for the project did not include property rights held by Maple Grove under the lease. Lot 19 
is part of Fairbanks Subdivision and therefore subject to the rights and obligations under the 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Fairbanks Subdivision. Lot 16 of that 
subdivisiorl consists of the common areas and parking lot for the office buildings in the 





parking areas, public utilities, fire and police protection access, drainage, 
receptacles and other uses appurtenant to the office buildings located on Lot 17 
through 20, Block 1." Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit 1, p. 3. This is also reflected in the Code of 
By-Laws of Maple Grove Professioilal Owners Association, Inc. "Each owner of all or any 
portion of Lots 17, 18, 19, and 20 in the said FAIRBANKS SUBDIVISlON shall have a 
permanent nonexclusive easement to use the Office Building Common Area [previously defined 
as Lot 16, Block 11 for purposes of ingress and egress from and to adjacent public streets, for 
automobile parking purposes, for utilities, and for trash receptacles, all subject to Rules and 
Regulations promulgated by this corporation as hereafter provided." Id., Exhibit 2, p. 4.' 
1 These instruments are ldentlfied m the Conmtment for Title Insurance uhich is Exhibit E to the Afiidavlt of 
Steven Prlce 
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It is clear from the materials submitted by ACHD that ACWD did in fact need to 
physically occupy portions of Lot 16 in order to complete the road widening project. Those 
portions of Lot 16 were, therefore, even under ACHD's reasoning, taken for a public use.' By 
taking portions of Lot 16, ACHD took a property interest that was appurtenant to Lot 19, which 
was leased by Maple Grove. 
This is siinilar to the claim addressed by the court in Winn-Dixie Stores, Iuc. v. Dcpt. of 
Trunsp., 839 So.2d 727 (Fla.App.2 dist., 2003). In that case, the Florida Department of 
Transportation condemned a portion of a shopping center including some of the parking space. 
Winn-Dixie leased space in the shopping center and asserted that it was entitled to a portion of 
the settlement agreement proceeds between the department and the shopping center owner for the 
taking of its leasehold interest in the condemned property. Id. at 728. The shopping center 
owner argued that Winn-Dixie's leasehold interest did not include the parking area that was 
taken. The lease described the premises as only the building and the land on whicl~ it stood. The 
court rejected that argument. 
The lease, taken as a whole, contemplates a leasehold interest of 
the common areas of the shopping center. First, the lease refers to 
the leased premises as the "store building and related 
improven~ents." "Related improvements" include the 
specifications for the parking area which require a minimum ratio 
of 4.85 parking spaces per 1,000 square feet of building area. 
Second, the tenns of the Lease indicate that its continuation or 
termination was contingent upon the availability of that parking. 
Third, Winn-Dixie paid separate consideration ("additional rent") 
for the monthly maintenance and repair for the parking area. The 
Lease required Winn-Dixie to pay .10 per square foot "as 
additional rent" to assist the landlord in maintaining and repairing 
the common areas, including "general repair and maintenance of 
all paved surfaces [and] repainting of parking area striping." 
2 Plaintiffs previously provided this Court with authority for the proposition that a sale under the threat of 
condemnation is the same as a taking as to a lessee's interest. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, page 13, and cases cited therein. None of the cases cited by ACHD contradict this principle. 
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Therefore, when read as a whole, the expressed terms of the Lease 
indicate that U'inn-Dixie bargained for an interest in the parking 
area of the shoppiilg center. 
In the present case, while the lease itself does not explicitly refer to the parking area and 
other portions of Lot 16, the declarations of the subdivision and the by-laws of the owners 
association demonstrate that by leasing Lot 19, Maple Grove was also entitled to an easement for 
parking and access to Lot 16, portions of which are now part of Ustick Road, Maple G r o ~ ~ e  and 
their sidewalks. Affidavit of Steven Price, Exhibit D 
Going beyond the legal descriptions, one can easily see how the taking of real property 
needed for the road widening project would affect a business located in the office building on Lot 
19. The new road and sidewalks are only a few feet from the office building. Id. Besides the 
obvious disruption to both employees and customers, the building is now in violati011 of the 
Boise City Zoning Ordinance set back restriction. Affidavit of Counsel, Exhibit 3, p. 10. 
(Section 11-04-03.07 requires a 20 food set back for side yard adjacent to a street for properties 
zoned R-IC.') Access and parking were also significantly affected. All of these [actors plainly 
played into ACHD's decision to purchase Dr. Curtis' property outright rather than attempting to 
carve out a section of it and being liable for damages for the remainder. This is also clear fiom 
the fact that ACHD, in the Settleinent Agreement, compensated Dr. Curtis for his shr-lre of 
business damages sustained by Curtis-Klure. If there was no taking of property that affected 
Curtis-Klure, then there would have been no reason for ACHD to compensate Dr. Curtis for his 
share of Maple Grove's business damages. 
3 The lots at Issue are all located in zoning d~strict R-IC. Aff. of Steven Price, Exhibit E, p. 8. 
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ACHD also takes the position that no taking at all occurred because it was able to 
purchase the property from Dr. Curtis through negotiation. "Fourth, the agreement reached 
between ACHD and Dr. Curtis was a negotiated, arms-length transaction for the purchase of the 
Dental Office Property and did not amount to a taking." ACHD's response, p. 21. ACHD 
further asserts that there was never any "threat of condemnation7' during the negotiations and 
ACHD had not issued any order of condemnatioil and that therefore there was no taking. Id., p. 
24. ACHD is asking this Court to ignore the testimony of Dr. Klure presented in his Affidavit 
that it was the ACHD road widening project and ACHD's expressed need for the property 
adjacent to the office building that required the relocation of his practice and that of Dr. Curtis' 
practice. Affidavit of Dr. Klure, l [qj 6-7. ACHD would have this Court believe that Dr. Curtis 
and Dr. Klure coincidentally decided, at the same time the road widening project commenced, to 
sever their business relationship that had lasted for more than 10 years and subject themselves to 
significant relocation costs. ACHD's argument would have this Court completely ignore the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the sale of the property. The record is clear in this 
respect - Dr. Curtis sold the property to ACHD as a result of the impending condemnation that 
clearly would have occurred if the parties u o ~ ~ l d  not have been able to reach an agreement. l h e  
fact that there was no order of condemnation or eminent domain action is only a result of the 
statutory duty imposed upon ACHD to attempt in good faith to purchase the property required for 
the project and does not have any effect on Dr. Klure's entitlement to busii~ess damages. 
ACHD7s argument is also directly contradicted by the plain language of the Settlement 
Agreement entered into between ACHD and Dr. ~ur t i s . "  
ACHD also cites a handlirl of cases for the proposition that negot~ations for the purchdse of 
property do not amount to a taking. However, here ~t is clear that much more than negotiations took 
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Therefore, even if this Coul-t determines that Maple Grove must demoi~strate a taking of 
some property interest in order to have standing to assert an inverse condemnation claim and 
therefore be entitled to business damages under 1.C. § 7-71 1(2), Maple Grove has done so by 
virtue of the fact that ACHD took (via a sale in lieu of condemnation) portions of Lot 16, which 
is common area and parking appurtenant to Lot 19. Whether this Court employs a technical 
analysis that looks to the terms of the lease, the property descriptions, and the recorded 
declarations, or instead observes the reality of the situation with respect to the impact of the 
project on the building formerly leased and occupied by Maple Grove, the same result obtains -- 
Maple Grove has standing to assert its claim for business damages. 
C. Relocation Costs are Proper Damages Under I.C. Ij 7-71 l(2). 
ACHD asserts that Plaintiffs are not entitled to business damages because Dr. Klure 
voluntarily relocated his business. This argument is without merit. First, it is clear that Dr. 
Klwe and Dr. Curtis both acted in good faith in deciding to relocate their businesses in order to 
mitigate their darnages caused by the road widening project. If Dr. Klure and Dr. Curtis had not 
taken such actions, ACHD would clearly be before this Co~lrt arg~iing a failure to mitigate. 
Second, and more importantly, ACHD7s argument was rejected by the Idaho Suprenle 
Coui-t in City ofh4cCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 11 18 (2006). In that case, the 
govemnlent made exactly the same argument that ACHD makes here - that relocation costs are 
not recoverable as business damages under I.C. 5 7-7 1 l(2). The Seubert court held: 
Idaho Code 7-71 1 does not attempt to define a limit of what 
damages are allowable under the statute, but rather refers to 
damages generally, providing for damages to any business "which 
the taking of a portion of any property . . . may reasonably cause." 
place - ACHD actually obta~ned the property. By do~ng so, u~hether by condernnat~on or by negotiated 
purchase -- ACHD has taken the property and therefore must compensate Maple Grove for ~ t s  damages. 
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I.C. 5 7-71 l(2). The language in I.C. 5 7-71 1 (2)(b), on which the 
City relies, does not preclude an award of relocation costs. In 
mainly serves to prevent a business from sitting on the condemned 
property and claiming business damages that could have been 
mitigated by relocating. 
Moreover, the measure of damages is not presently at issue. Plaintiffs have sought a 
ruling from this Court on their declaratory judgment claim that they are entitled to seek damages 
under I.C. 9 7-7 1 l(b). The nature and amount of those damages will be proven at a later date. 
111. CONCLUSION 
ACHD would have this Court ignore the plain language of Idaho's eminent domain 
statute, the clearly expressed intent of the Idaho Legislature to compensate qualifying businesses, 
and the plain facts surrounding their need to acquire property as part of the Ustick Road widening 
project. The undisputed facts in the summary judgment record denlollstrate that ACHD needed 
to acqutrc property at the intersection of Ustick and Maple G r o ~  e, including property subject to 
the lease between Dr. Curtis and Maple Grove. It is equally clear that by widening Ustick at its 
intersect~on with Maple Grove, ACHD rendered the office building previously occupied by 
Maple Grove unsuitable for use as a business and made the decision that it would be more 
economical to purchase all of the property located on that comer outright rather than severing the 
property and paying damages. Indeed, ACHD proceeded to coinpensate Dr. Curtis for the real 
property as well as business damages for his share of Maple Grove. Now, ACHD must similarly 
compensate Dr. Klure for his share of the business damages suffered by Maple Grove. Plaintiffs 
are therefore entitled to an order from this Court granting them partial summary judgment and 
holding that they are entitled to damages pursuant to I.C. S; 7-71 l(2). 
REPLY IS  SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 12 
For these reasotls, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that this Court should grant their blotion 
for Summary Judgi~lent. 
F- 
DATED this 10 day of October, 2008. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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J. Frederick Mack 
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Mary V. York 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank P l a ~ a  
101 South Capitol Bo~llevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CURTIS-KLW, PLLC, dba MAPLE ) CaseNo.: CVOC0716381 
GROVE DENTISTRY, and JACK D. 1 





) ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, ) 
Defendant. 1 
) 
This case is before the Court on the Plaintiffs' motion for sunimary judgment. The case 
arises out of a road improvement project on Ustick Road in Boise. Jack D. Klure, D.D.S., 
practiced with Thomas R. Curtis, D.D.S. in Curtis-Klure PLLC which did business under the 
name Maple Grove Dentistry. They practiced together for over ten years. Maple Grove 
Dentistry leased the building that it used from Dr. Curtis, who was the sole owner of the building 
and, through other entities, also the owner of several parcels of real property near the comer of 
Ustick and Maple Grove. ACHD needed a strip of land which ran along Ustick road and it made 
an offer to Dr. Curtis who counter-offered with his own proposal that ACHD buy all of the 
property in which he had an interest. When Dr. Klure learned that ACHD was going to engage 
in the construction project, he decided to leave Maple Grove Dentistry and relocate his practice. 
After he left the practice, and after extensive negotiations, Dr. Curtis finalized an agreement for 
ACHD to buy both the property on which Maple Grove Dentistry was located and other propert) 
that he owned through other entities. The agreement did not provide for any compensation for 
Dr. Klure. We has moved for summary judgment asserting that he is entitled to business 





jamages under I.C. 5 7-7 1 1. 
1. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS 
A party may obtain summary judgment if there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
he moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). Summary judgment 
s appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, il 
my, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
:ntitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fenwick v. Idaho Dept. oflands, 144 Idaho 3 18,322, 
160 P.3d 757, 760 (2007) (citing lnfunger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45,44 P.3d 11 00 (2002)) 
summary judgment is proper when a party fails to establish the existence of an element essential 
o that party's case upon which that party bears burden of proof at trial. Smith v, Meridian Joint 
ichool District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 P.2d 583,588 (1996). The Court is to liberally 
:onstrue the entire record in favor of the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable 
nferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Seiniger Law Office, P.A v. North Pacific Ins. 
To., 145 Idaho 24 1,246, 178 P.3d 606,611 (2008) (citing Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 138 
daho 249,61 P.3d 606 (2002)). 
The issue involved in this case is whether ACHD took any property in which Dr. Klure 
lad an interest without the payment of just compensation. Eminent domain cases are not 
'ordinary civil cases." Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203,217, 596 P.2d 75, 89 (1978). Their histor: 
-eflects the power of government to take property for public use and the concomitant right of 
Iroperty owners under the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Constitution to require just compensatior 
ior the taking. Id. Because this is an inverse condemnation case, the issues of whether there wa 
a taking for which just compensation is required, when the taking occurred and the nature of the 
property interest taken are issues for this court. Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass 'n, 140 Idaho 
536, 542,96 P.3d 637,643 (2004); Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777,780, 53 P.3d 
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228,83 1 (2002); Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667,670,603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1 979); 
4da Cozlnty Highway Dist. v. Sharp, 135 Idaho 888,892,26 P.3d 1225,1229 (Ct.App.2001). 
rhere are no awardable darnages unless the plaintiffs' property has been the subject of a 
'taking." KMST LLC v. County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577,67 P.3d 56 (2003). Where these issues 
%re to be detennined by the Court, they are proper for resolution on a motion for summary 
udgment. Brown v. City of Twin Fulls, 124 Idaho 39, 855 P.2d 876 (1993); Reisenuuer v. Stute, 
120 Idaho 36,41,813 P.2d 375,380 ( C t . ~ ~ ~ . 1 9 9 1 ) . '  
11. 
FACTS 
The plaintiff, Dr. Jack D. Klure was in a dental practice, Maple Grove Dentistry with Dr. 
Thomas Curtis for about ten years. Dr. Klure and Dr. Curtis were equal partners in Curtis-Klure 
PLLC, which operated Maple Grove Dentistry. Curtis-Klure, PLLC leased the building for the 
practice from Dr. Curtis who was its sole owner under a ten-year lease commencing on January 
1, 1997 and extending to December 3 1,2006. Affidavit of Jack D. Klure, D.D.S. Exh. 1. Dr. 
Curtis not only owned the real property, Parcel 46, on which Maple Grove Dentistry was locatec 
but he also owned interests in several adjacent parcels near the corner of Ustick Road and Maplc 
Grove through other entities: Parcel 44 which was owned by Maple Grove Parking, LLC and 
Parcel 45 which was owned by Maple Grove Professional Center Owners Association, lnc. ld.  
Exh. D. 
In late 2005, ACHD took steps to advance a construction project on Ustick which was 
designed to create better traffic flow, decrease congestion and improve sidewalk safety. ("Ustic 
project"). Affidavit of Steven B. Price. The project required a strip of land approximately 
I The complaint alleged the facts required for an inverse condemnation claim although it did not expressly 
denominate the claim for relief as one for inverse condemnation. Prior to the summary judgment argument, the 
plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to expressly call their claim one for inverse condemnation. The 
defendant filed a notice of non-objection to the motion pointing out that the nature of the claim as one for inverse 
condemnation had already been acknowledged by the Court in its Decision on February 19,2008. ACHD did not 
waive its argument that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief for inverse condemnation. 
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thirteen feet wide and one thousand feet long for a total area of approximately 13,000 square 
Feet. The Ustick project crossed several of the parcels owned by Dr. Curtis, directly or as 
autlined above. As designed, the Ustick project ran along the edge of Parcel 45, adjacent to 
Ustick Road, along a sidewalk in front of Parcel 46 and across part of Parcel 45 and through 
Parcel 44. No part of the property of Maple Grove Dentistry was required for the Ustick project 
since the 13-foot wide strip ran along the front of Maple Grove Dentistry, through landscaping 
next to the sidewalk, and did not encroach upon it or otherwise physically touch any portion of 
the Maple Grove Dentistry building. 
ACHD, as required by law, contacted Dr. Curtis to work out a purchase of his property 
that was needed for the Ustick project. Dr. Klure was not contacted because ACHD determined 
that none of the property in which his practice was located was needed for the project nor would 
it be touched or "physically affected by the acquisition" and the business could continue to 
operate. Id. Dr. Klure did not own any of the real property needed for the Ustick project nor dic 
he own the building in which Maple Grove Dentistry operated. ACHD entered into negotiations 
with Dr. Curtis with the goal of purchasing the necessary property without condemnation 
proceedings. It is part of the regular practice of ACHD to acquire real property needed for its 
purposes without litigation and to negotiate good faith agreements for the fair market value of 
property it needs. ACHD is also subject to a legal requirement that it negotiate in good faith to 
purchase property before it can exercise any of its eminent domain powers. It is not disputed 
that, if it had been necessary to condemn property, the only property ACHD would have sought 
to condemn was the 13 foot wide strip of land. No condemnation action was ever brought. 
ACHD contacted Dr. Curtis in January, 2006 to negotiate terms for the purchase of the 
strip of property needed for the Ustick Project. In May, 2006, Dr. Curtis countered with a 
request that ACHD acquire his entire property and all of his property interests, not just the strip 
of land that ACHD needed for the Ustick Project. It is not contradicted that ACHD did not neec 
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or require the additional property which Dr. Curtis wished to sell. It could not have acquired the 
additional property through its eminent domain powers because the additional property would 
not be necessary for the Ustick project. ACHD had the property appraised and offered the fair 
market value of the property for the entire tract of land. Dr. Curtis was represented by counsel. 
Prior to final sale terms being reached, Dr. Curtis entered into an agreement to give 
ACWD access to the portion of the property it needed for the Ustick project. He entered into a 
right-of-entry agreement with ACHD which expressly required ACHD to "prevent disruption of 
the business operations on the Property.. . ." The right-of-entry agreement acknowledged that 
negotiations for the purchase of all of Dr. Curtis' interests in all of the parcels were ongoing. Thl 
final settlement agreement by which ACHD purchased all of Dr. Curtis' property interests in all 
of the parcels he owned including the dentist office property was formally signed on June 22, 
2007. Prior to the final agreement, Dr. Klure decided to terminate the partnership with Dr. 
Curtis and had relocated his practice. He relocated his practice in April, 2007. Construction 
work began on the Ustick project in November of 2007. 
Dr. Klure was a half-owner of Maple Grove Dentistry. He has never contended that he 
owned the real property which had been leased to Maple Grove Dentistry through Curtis-Klure 
PLLC by Dr. Curtis for a ten year term commencing in January, 1997, and terminating on 
December 3 1,2006, subject to an option to renew2. Affidavit of Jack D. Klure, Exh. 1. Dr. 
Klure decided that he should relocate his dental practice because he was skeptical about the 
interference the Ustick Project would cause with access to it and "ACHD's poor reputation for 
showing no concern for the interests of businesses in the pathway of construction." Affidavit of 
Jack D. Klure, D.D.S. The Lease Agreement itself addresses condemnation and provides that, it 
the entire property were taken under the power of eminent domain, the lease would be 
"he renewal procedure is set forth in the Lease Agreement. It is not clear that it was followed. According to the 
Lease terms, if the formal renewal procedure were not followed, the tenancy would become a month to month 
tenancy. 
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Lease Agreement addressed a partial taking as well and provided that any award for the taking ol 
all or part of the premises under the power of eminent domain was the property of the landlord 
subject to certain damages of the tenant. A sale under threat of condemnation or "while 
condemnation proceedings are pending' was to be deemed a taking." Id. After the lease term 
was over on December 3 1,2006, the tenancy was to convert to a month to month tenancy unless 
notice was given to exercise the option to renew as provided for in the Agreement. Id. The 
settlement agreement preserved any claims for compensation Dr. Klure might have had relating 
to his interest in Maple Grove Dentistry. His attempts to negotiate a settlement for any damages 










The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, 
made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Dolan v. City of Tzgard, 5 12 
U.S. 374, 129 L. Ed. 2d 304, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994), provides: "Nor shall private property be 
1 7 
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taken for public use, without just compensation." The Idaho Constitution, Article 1 Ej 14 also 








ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefore." Any property owner who 
believes that his or her property, or some interest in it has been appropriated for public use 
without just compensation, may bring an action for inverse condemnation. KMST LLC v. 
County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577,67 P.3d 56 (2003); McQuillen v. City of Arnrnon, 1 13 Idaho 7 19, 
747 P.2d 74 1 (1987). The property owner cannot maintain an inverse condemnation action 
unless there has actually been a taking of his or her property. Covington v. Jefferson County, 13 
Idaho 777, 53 P.3d 828 (2002). In order to establish a claim for inverse condemnation, the 
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action must be: 
(1) instituted by a property owner who 
(2) asserts that his or her property, or some interest in it, has been invaded or appropriate( 
for public use 
(3) to the extent of a taking, 
(4) but without due process of law, and 
(5) without payment of just compensation. 
Covington v. Jeferson County, id., citing City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851, 856, S5. 
P.2d 596, 601 (Ct. App. 1993) and (citing Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 217, 596 P.2d 75, 8' 
(1 978). Dr. Klure is required to establish that ACHD has engaged in a "taking" of his interest ii 
the property. Both sides agree that, under certain circumstances, a leasehold interest is a] 
interest which, if taken, can be the subject of an inverse condemnation action. In this cast 
ACHD, had it utilized eminent domain procedures, which it did not, would have sought only ti 
condemn the thirteen foot strip it needed for the Ustick project. The strip it required would nc 
have involved the building in which Maple Grove Dentistry was housed. The project, a 
originally designed, would have gone along the outside of the building adjacent to Ustick Roac 
a strip next to the existing sidewalk. Dr. Curtis countered ACHD's offer for the strip with hi 
own proposal that ACHD buy his interests in each of the parcels he owned, including all c 
Parcel 46, which Dr. Curtis owned as the sole owner. Prior to the sale being closed, a right-of 
entry agreement had been reached on November 10, 2006 which allowed ACHD to begi 
construction on the strip it needed without waiting for the entire deal to close but under th 
express requirement that the construction not interfere with the business operations on th 
property. Affidavit of Steven B. Price, Exh. I. When the agreement closed on June 22, 200' 
Dr. Klure had already relocated his practice and the lease had been terminated. Under th 
circumstances of this case, there was no "taking" since the sale was an arms-length transaction c 
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the sale of all of Dr. Curtis' property. Dr. Klure had no interest in the property. While the Lease 
Agreement treats the sale of the premises "under threat of condemnation or while condemnation 
proceedings are pending" as a "taking," there was never a threat of condemnation for th 
building used by Maple Grove Dentistry nor were any condemnation proceedings pending. 1 
Affidavit of Steven B. Price, Affidavit of Jack D. Klure, D.D.S., Exh. 1. Dr. Curtis sold th 
property after the lease was terminated and after Dr. Klure had relocated his practice. As ACH 
has pointed out, because it did not need the portion of the property on which the building fo 
Maple Grove Dentistry was located, it could not have used its power of eminent domain t 
acquire it. The sale of the building came as a result of the owner's counter-offer, not as a resul 
of condemnation proceedings by ACHD. Moreover, Dr. Klure, in response to ACHD's origina 
plan to acquire the thirteen foot wide strip, wanted to relocate his practice, not because it woul 
involve the building in which Maple Grove Dentistry was located, but "because of the restricte 
access the Property would be left with upon completion of the Project and because of ACHD' 
poor reputation for showing no concern for the interests of businesses in the pathway o 
construction." Affidavit of Jack D. Klure, D.D.S., paragraph 7. 
At the time of the sale, Dr. Klure had relocated and the lease had been terminated. l'h 
loss of the building came through the sale by the property owner, not governmental action. Th 
threat of possible condemnation in the future from ACHD's original proposal to purchase th 
strip of land needed for the Ustick project does not constitute a taking. City of Lewisto~z v. 
Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851, 853 P. 2d 596 (Ct. App. 1993). In this case, condemnation proceeding 
were never brought and a voluntary sale of the property was accomplished after the lease wa 
terminated. 
The statutory framework for just compensation when the government exercises it 
eminent domain powers is set forth by the Legislature in I.C. $ 7-701 et. seq. Business damage 
are awardable under I.C. 5 7-71 l(2): 
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2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a large 
parcel: (a) the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, b; 
reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction o 
the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff; and (b) the damages to an: 
business qualiQing under this subsection having more than five (5) years' standing whicl 
the taking of a portion of the property and the construction of the improvement in tht 
manner proposed by the plaintiff may reasonably cause. The business must be owned b: 
the party whose lands are being condemned or be located upon adjoining lands owned o 
held by such party. Business damages under this subsection shall not be awarded if thc 
loss can reasonably be prevented by a relocation of the business or by taking steps that i 
reasonably prudent person would take, or for damages caused by temporary busines: 
interruption due to construction; and provided further that compensation for busines. 
damages shall not be duplicated in the compensation otherwise awarded to the propert: 
owner for damages pursuant to subsections (1) and (2)(a) of this section 7-71 1, Idahc 
Code. 
In Cijy of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 11 18(2006), a case involving a 
:ondemnation action brought by the City of McCall, the Supreme Court held that a business 
Iwner with five years standing was entitled to damages under I.C. tj 7-71 1 even though the 
ousiness held no compensable interest in the underlying real property. Because the property was 
:he subject of a taking, the business owners on the land taken, and the adjacent land, were 
entitled to their statutory right of compensation. Maple Grove Dentistry was a business which 
was in operation for over ten years so it met the requirement of having more than five years 
standing. Dr. Klure was a half-owner of Maple Grove Dentistry. However, the property was no 
taken by ACHD. It was sold by Dr. Curtis. ACHD could not have brought eminent domain 
proceedings to condemn Dr. Curtis' interest in the Maple Grove Dentistry building because it d i ~  
not require the building for its project. The plaintiffs have argued that this interpretation would 
deprive them of their rights under I.C. tj 7-71 1. The right to recover in an inverse condemnation 
action arises from a governmental "taking". If a person with an interest in property loses that 
interest as a result of a private person's action, their right of action is against that private person 
who deprived them of their interest. The right to receive just compensation from the governmen 
for a taking, requires that the government actually take the property. ACHD purchased the 
DECISION AND ORDER - 9 





6 Business damages are not awarded if the loss can be reasonably prevented by the relocation of I I 
property from its owner. The reason ACHD acquired the Maple Grove Dentistry building is 
because of the voluntary, arms-length sale of it by the property owner, Dr. Curtis. ACHD never 
sought to utilize the building for the Ustick project and it would never have been able to 
condemn the building since the building was not required for the construction. 
7 the business nor can they be awarded for temporary interruptions due to construction. Dr. Klure I I 
8 relocated his practice because of his fear of disruption during construction which is not a I I 
9 compensable ham.  Even if one were to assume that Maple Grove Dentistry, as an adjacent I I 
10 property, would have been damaged by the construction of the Ustick project on the strip which I I 
1 1 ACHD needed for the Ustick project and the sale somehow worked a taking of that strip, I I 
12 business damages are not awarded if the loss can "reasonably be prevented" by relocating the I I 
13 business. Dr. Klure relocated his practice. Moreover, Dr. Klure's concern outlined in his I I 
14 Affidavit was not that the project as originally proposed would damage Maple Grove Dentistry I I 
15 1 / but rather the construction of the entire project would cause disruption to the business. I 





21 denied. The plaintiffs had no interest which was the subject of a taking by ACHD. The property I I 
Temporary business interruption due to construction is not compensable under I.C. 7-71 1 (2).' 
There is no right to any business damages under I.C. $ 7-71 l(2). 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
22 was sold by its owner, Dr. Curtis, based upon his counter-proposal, after an arms-length and I I 
23 protracted negotiation for the sale of all of his property interests at Maple Grove and Ustick. The I I 
24 
25 
3 No one can seriously question that there can be serious inconvenience caused by road construction projects as well 
as severe economic consequences. No criticism of Dr. Klure's concern about how the construction would be 
handled nor his decision to relocate is intended. 
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broperty was sold after the lease was terminated and the business was relocated. Based upon the 
acts of this case, the plaintiffs cannot prove an entitlement to business damages under I.C. $ 7- 
r1 l(2). 
Dated this Januar 
District Judge 
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J. Frederick Mack (ISB #1428) 
Steven C. Bowman (ISB #4404) 
Mary V. York (ISB #5020) 
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Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
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Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
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Attorneys for Defendant Ada County Highway District 
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CURTIS-KLURE, PLLC, dba MAPLE 
GROVE DENTISTRY, and JACK D. 
KLURE, D.D.S., 
Plaintiffs, 
Case No. CV OC 071638 1 
DEFENDANT ACEID'S MOTION 
FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
Defendant Ada County Highway District ("ACHD"), by and through its attorneys 
of record, Holland & Hart LLP, respectfully moves the Court for entry of judgment in 
this action pursuant to Rule 58(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. ACHD makes 
this motion on the grounds that all three claims by Plaintiffs Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba 
Maple Grove Dentistry, and Jack D. Klure, D.D.S. ("Klure") in this matter have been 
fully adjudicated and decided by the Court. 
On September 14, 2007, Plaintiffs Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba Maple Cirove 
Dentistry, and Jack D. Klure, D.D.S. ("Klure") filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief 
DEFENDANT ACHD'S MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT - 1 Q O i 0 9  
and Damages alleging two causes of action. In his first cause of action, Klure sought a 
declaratory judgment consisting of "a judicial declaration that it is entitled to business 
damages from ACHD as a result of the Project under Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2)" and a 
determination of the amount of business damages to which Klure was entitled. 
Complaint, 11 23, 24; see also id., Prayer for Relief, p. 6. In his second cause of action, 
Kiure sought damages for relocation costs and expenses incurred when Klure relocated 
his dentistry practice, which Klure alleged was caused by ACHD's Project. Complaint, 
77 29, 30, see also id., Prayer for Relief, p. 6. Klure subsequently amended his 
complaint to add a cause of action for inverse condemnation in which he sought an 
award of just compensation as a result of ACI-ID's alleged taking of Klure's property. 
On February 19, 2008, the Court granted ACHD's motion to dismiss Klure's 
second cause of action for relocation damages. Decision and Order Re: Motion to 
Dzsrniss, at 11 (Feb. 19, 2008). The Court concluded as a matter of law that Klure's 
"claim for relocation benefits under I.C. fj 40-2004 is not properly before the Court at 
this time and the motion to dismiss is granted with respect to that claim." Id., at 7. 
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the claim. Id., at 11 ("For the reasons stated in this 
Decision, the claim for relocation expenses under I.C. 5 40-2004 is dismissed since it 
must be presented through a petition for judicial review after the exhaustion of 
administrative remedies."). 
On January 26, 2009, the Court issued its decision resolving Klure's two 
remaining claims. Decision and Order, at 10-1 1 (Jan. 26, 2009). In the Decision and 
Order, the Court denied Klure's motion for summary judgment and made the following 
conclusions as a matter of law: 
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1. In order to recover just compensation, including business damages 
pursuant to Idaho Code 5 7-71 1(2), "Klure is required to establish that ACHD 
has engaged in a "taking" of his interest in the property." Id., at 6; see also id., 
3, 6 (citing KMST LLC v .  County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003) and 
Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 53 P.3d 828 (2002)). 
2. "Under the circumstances of this case, there was no "taking" since the sale 
was an arms-length transaction of the sale of all of Dr. Curtis' property. Dr. 
Klure had no interest in the property." Decision and Order, at 7-8. 
3. Additionally, no taking occurred because ACHD "could not have used its 
power of eminent domain to acquire [the property]" and because as of the time 
the sale occurred, Klure "had relocated and the lease had been terminated." Id., 
at 8. 
4. Klure "had no interest which was the subject of a taking by ACHD." Id., 
at 10. 
5 .  "Based upon the facts of this case, the plaintiffs cannot prove an 
entitlement to business damages under I.C. 5 7-71 1(2)." Id. p. 11. 
The Court's ruling thus fully adjudicated and resolved Klure's claims for 
business damages under Idaho Code 5 7-71 l(2) and for inverse condemnation in favor 
of  ACHD. 
Through its two rulings, the Court resolved all claims between the parties and 
fully and finally adjudicated this matter. 
WHEREFORE, ACHD respectfully requests that the Court enter final judgment 
in favor of ACHD in this matter, in the form proposed by ACHD submitted with this 
Motion, and instruct the clerk to enter such judgment in the civil docket. 
DATED this 6th day of February, 2009. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
/ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Debora K. Kristensen [rlj Hand Delivered 
Martin Hendrickson Overnight Mail 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP Facsimile 
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P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Phone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
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Defendant. 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Ada County Highway 
District's ("ACHD") Motion for Entry of Judgment pursuant to Rule 58(a) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court has reviewed the motion and, finding good cause, 
hereby enters judgment as follows. 
On February 19, 2008, the Court entered its Decision and Order Re: Motion to 
Dismiss dismissing Plaintiffs Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba Maple Grove Dentistry, and Jack 
D. Klure, D.D.S.'s ("Klure") claim for relocation damages. The Court determined as a 
matter of law that Klure's claim for relocation damages under I.C. 5 40-2004 was not 
properly before the Court, and should have been brought, if at all, as a petition for 
judicial review. 
On January 26, 2009, the Court entered its decision on summary judgment, 
determining as a matter of law that : 
1. In order to recover just compensation, including business damages 
pursuant to Idaho Code 5 7-71 1(2), "Klure is required to establish that ACHD 
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has engaged in a "taking" of his interest in the property." Decision and Order, at 
6 (Jan. 26, 2009); see also id., 3, 6 (citing KMST LLC v. County ofAda, 138 
Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003) and Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777, 
53 P.3d 828 (2002)). 
2. "Under the circumstances of this case, there was no "taking" since the sale 
was an arms-length transaction of the sale of all of Dr. Curtis' property. Dr. 
Klure had no interest in the property." Decision and Order, at 7-8. 
3. Additionally, no taking occurred because ACHD "could not have used its 
power of eminent domain to acquire [the property]" and because as of the time 
the sale occurred, Klure "had relocated and the lease had been terminated." Id., 
at 8. 
4. Klure "had no interest which was the subject of a taking by ACHD." Id., 
at 10. 
5. "Based upon the facts of this case, the plaintiffs cannot prove an 
entitlement to business damages under I.C. 5 7-71 1 (2)." Id. p. 11. 
The Court's ruling thus fully adjudicated and resolved Klure's claims for 
business damages under Idaho Code 5 7-7 1 l(2) and for inverse condemnation in favor 
of  ACHD. 
Through the two decisions referenced above, the Court resolved all claims 
between the parties and fully and finally adjudicated this matter. 
Based on the foregoing, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that ACHD's motion 
for entry of judgment should be, and is hereby, GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this matter, 
and all claims by Plaintiffs, should be, and are hereby, DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that ACHD is the 
prevailing party in this action pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), and the 
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Court shall consider requests by ACHD for costs and attorneys fees upon appropriate 
-- 
application by ACHD. 
-4-G. /-! 4 
DATED this ( C day of 
- .v Jbistrlct Court Judge 
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GIVENS PURSLEY LLP Telecopy (Fax) 
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101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1400 
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CASE NO. CV OC 0716381 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF 
DECISION AND ORDER AND 
WITHDRAWAL OF JUDGMENT 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP 
and, hereby move this Court, pursuant to 1.R.C.P. Rules 1 l(a)(2)(B) and 59(e), for an Order 
reconsidering the Decision and Order entered on January 26, 2009 and withdrawing the 
Judgment that was entered on February 10, 2009. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 7(b)(3)(C), Plaintiffs 
intend to file a brief within fourteen (14) days in support of this motion. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 24th day of February, 2009. 
GIVENS PURS&Y LLP 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF DECISION AND ORDER AND WITHDRAWAI, OF 
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CERTIFICATE OF SEKVlCE 
I hereby certify that on the 24th day of February, 2009, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated: 
I 
J. Frederick Mack 
Steven C. Bowman 
Mary V. York 
HOLLAND & HA RT LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
10 1 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, 1D 83701 
Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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Attorneys for Defendant Ada County Highway District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CURTIS-KLURE, PLLC, dba MAPLE GROVE 
DENTISTRY, and JACK D. KLURE, D.D.S., 
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
Case No. CV OC 0716381 
Defendant. 
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER AND RESPONSE 
TO MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
JUDGMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba Maple Grove Dentistry and Jack D. Klure, D.D.S.'S 
("Klure") have filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the Court's February 6,2009 Decision 
and Order and withdrawal of the judgment entered in this case. Klure's motion for 
reconsideration is properly denied because Klure has presented no new argument or legal 
authority to justify the Court's reconsideration of its prior ruling. Instead, Klure merely renews 
his prior arguments and once again asserts that he is entitled to takings-related damages under 
Idaho's eminent domain statutes where there has been no "taking" and where Klure had no 
property interests that could have been "taken" by Defendant, Ada County Highway District 
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW JUDGMENT - 1 
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("ACHD"). The Court's prior decision correctly determined that no taking occurred in this case, 
and Klure's motion for reconsideration should be denied. 
Klure's motion to withdraw the judgment in this case should also be denied because the 
Court's Decision and Order adjudicated all of Klure's remaining claims, leaving no basis, theory 
or claim upon which Klure could recover from ACHD. Klure's motion for summary judgment 
placed at issue his entitlement to business damages from ACHD under the two remaining claims 
in the case. Upon the Court's determination that no taking had occurred and that Klure was not 
entitled to any business damages, there were no claims or issues left for the Court to resolve. 
Accordingly, judgment in favor of ACHD was properly entered. Hanvood v. Tulbert, 136 Idaho 
672,677-78'39 P.3d 612,617-18 (2001) ("The district court may grant summary judgment to a 
non-moving party even if the party has not filed its own motion with the court."). 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This case arose fiom Klure's claim for business and relocation damages resulting from an 
alleged taking by ACHD as part of its road improvement project on Ustick Road in ~ o i s e . '  In 
connection with the project, ACHD purchased several parcels of land and property interests 
owned by Thomas R. Curtis, D.D.S. (Affidavit of Steven B. Price in support of ACHD's response 
to Klure's motion for summary judgment ("Price Aff.) 71 49-5 1, Ex. A, J; Decision and Order 
(Jan. 26,2009) at 1, 3-4). ACHD did not require all of Dr. Curtis's property for the Ustick Road 
project, nor did it have the authority to condemn under its powers of eminent domain all of Dr. 
Curtis's property. (Price Aff. at 77 20,23-24, 38 Ex. C, D; Idaho Code § 7-704(2); Decision and 
Order at 4-5). However, as part of the preliminary negotiations for the purchase, Dr. Curtis 
I The fact section of ACHD's brief consists only of a summary of the facts of the case and does 
not set out in full the entire factual record, which is described in full in ACHD's response brief to 
Klure's motion for summary judgment. To the extent necessary, ACHD incorporates by 
reference its prior memoranda and supporting affidavits. 
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offered to sell ACHD all of his property and property interests, rather than just the small strip of 
land necessary for the project. (Price Aff at 7 37; Decision and Order at 4). Ultimately, ACHD 
and Dr. Curtis agreed on the terms of the sale, and the agreement by which ACHD purchased all 
of Dr. Curtis's property interests was executed on June 22,2007. (Price Aff. at 77 59-61, Ex. J; 
Decision and Order at 5). 
Dr. Klure's involvement with the property came as a result of his business relationship 
with Dr. Curtis, through Curtis-Klure, PLLC, and a lease agreement between Curtis-Klure, PLLC 
and Dr. Curtis for the lease of a building located on one of Dr. Curtis's properties, from which 
the two dentists operated their respective practices. (Price Aff. at 7'7 28-29, Ex. G; Decision and 
Order at 3-4). Dr. Klwe did not own any of the property that was required by ACHD for the 
project, nor did he own any of the property purchased by ACHD. (Price Aff. at 77 3 1, 55,64, 
Exs. D, G; Decision and Order at 4-5). During the course of the negotiations between ACHD 
and Dr. Curtis, Dr. Klure relocated his dentistry business, and the lease agreement between Dr. 
Curtis and Curtis-Klure, PLLG terminated. (Price Aff. at 7 58; Decision and Order at 4). In fact, 
ACHD's agreement with Dr. Curtis for the purchase of the property included a specific provision 
wherein Dr. Curtis warranted that as of June 22,2007-the date ACHD purchased the 
property-Dr. Klure no longer owned any interest in the property and that the lease agreement 
had been terminated. (Price Aff. at 77 59-60, Ex. J, Section H; Decision and Order at 4). Thus, 
as of the date ACHD purchased Dr. Curtis's property, Klure did not own any interest in the 
property, nor did he have an operating lease agreement with Dr. Curtis. (Id.) 
There are no facts or evidence in the record that ACHD threatened condemnation as part 
of its negotiations to purchase Dr. Curtis's property or that the sale was made under threat of 
condemnation. Rather, the purchase of Dr. Curtis's property and property interests by ACHD 
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 
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was the result of good faith negotiations by both Dr. Curtis and ACHD. (Id. at yfi 34,37-39,47, 
49-51,65-70; Decision and Order at 7-8). 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On August 1 1,2008 Klure moved for summary judgment seeking to have the Court 
"enter an order declaring that Klure is entitled to an award of business damages under Idaho 
Code 5 7-71 1 and ACHD is liable for those damages." (Memo. in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 14). On January 26,2009, the Court entered its Decision and Order 
finding that Klure was not entitled to damages because there had been no "taking." (Decision 
and Order at 7). The Court held that: 
Under the circumstances, there was no "taking" since the sale was 
an arms-length transaction of the sale of all of Dr. Curtis' property. 
(Decision and Order at 7-8). Where no "taking" had occurred as a matter of law, there was no 
basis for recovery by Klure against ACHD upon Klure's inverse condemnation or business 
damage theories. Additionally, the Court held that where Klure relocated his business, he could 
not recover business damages under Idaho Code 5 7-71 1, because the express language of the 
statute precluded the recovery of business damages "if the loss can be reasonably prevented by 
the relocation of the business." (Id. at 10). Similarly, the Court concluded that the statute also 
precluded the recovery of any damages resulting from temporary interruptions due to the 
construction of ACHD's project-to the extent that any such damages occurred. (Id.). 
Accordingly, the Court held that there was no right for recovery of business damages by Klure 
under the provisions of Idaho Code 5 7-7 1 l(2). 
The ruling, combined with the Court7 s prior dismissal of Klure's claims for relocation 
damages on February 19,2008, left no remaining basis upon which Klure could recover from 
ACHD. Accordingly, the Court properly entered final judgment on February 10,2009 in favor 
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of ACHD. Klure now seeks to have the Court withdraw the final judgment and reconsider its 
Decision and Order. Both of Klure's motions should be denied. 
A. Klure has Presented No New Facts, Arguments, or Legal Support to Justify 
Reconsideration of the Court's Decision, and His Motion for Reconsideration 
Should Be Denied. 
Klure has requested reconsideration of the Court's denial of summary judgment pursuant 
to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 1 1 (a)(2)(B). Under Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B), Klure, as the moving 
party, bears the burden of presenting any new facts to the Court that would support or justify the 
Court's reconsideration of its prior ruling. Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 344, 179 P.3d 
303,307 (2008) (citing Couer d1Alene Mining Co. v. First National Bank of North Idaho, 11 8 
Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (2006)(additional citations omitted)). Whether to grant or 
deny a request for reconsideration rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Curnpbell v. 
Reugan, 144 Idaho 254,258, 159 P.3d 891, 895 (2007) (citing Curnell v. Barker Mgmt. Inc., 137 
Idaho 322,329,48 P.3d 651,658 (2002)). 
Klure has failed to satisfy his burden on a motion for reconsideration and has not 
presented any new facts or argument to justify the Court's reconsideration of its Decision and 
Order. Rather, Klure's motion for reconsideration is essentially a renewal of his prior arguments 
made in support of his summary judgment motion. The Court properly rejected Klure's 
arguments in its prior decision, and no new basis has been presented that would require or 
support reconsideration of that decision. On this basis alone, Klure's motion should be denied. 
B. Klure's Arguments for Reconsideration Continue to be Unsupported by the Facts of 
the Case and Contrary to Idaho Law, and Accordingly Klure's Motion is Properly 
Denied. 
Klure basically presents tlwee arguments to support his motion for reconsideration: 
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(1) the present case is not an inverse condemnation case, but instead is a statutory 
business damages case based upon City of McCull v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 
P.3d 1 18 (2006); 
(2) even if this case is an inverse condemnation case, a "taking" occurred by 
ACHD's purchase of the property because the purchase was made under "threat 
of condemnation" based upon the Nevada case of Fuddy Duddy v. State 
Department of Transportation, 950 P.2d 733 (Nev. 1997); and 
(3) Klure sustained damages in this case and therefore issues remain to be decided 
by the Court in this matter. 
(Klure's Mem. in Supp. of Mtn. for Reconsideration and Mtn. to Withdraw at 2-4). 
In order for Klure to prevail on any of these arguments, ACHD's purchase of Dr. Curtis's 
property must rise to the level of a "taking" such that Klure is entitled to compensation. The 
Court properly rejected this argument and concluded in its Decision and Order that there was no 
"taking" of Klure's property by ACHD, and therefore Klure was not entitled to damages under 
condemnation principles and Idaho Code 5 7-7 1 1. (Decision and Order at 7-8, 9-1 0, 10- 1 1). 
Moreover, within the context of each of Klure's arguments for reconsideration, absent a taking 
all three arguments must fail: 
(1) Seubert requires that a "taking" occur before business damages can be 
awarded under Idaho Code 7-71 1 ; 
(2) Idaho law, as opposed to Nevada law, provides that a purchase of property by 
a governmental authority with powers of eminent domain does not amount to a 
"taking under threat of condemnation" or a judicial taking of property. City of 
Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 851,853 P.2d 596,603 (Ct. App. 1993); and 
(3) Under Idaho law, there must be a '"taking" of property in order for a 
landowner to maintain a claim for damages under Idaho's eminent domain 
statutes. Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777,780, 53 P.3d 828, 83 1 
(2002). 
Each of these arguments will be addressed in more detail below. 
In his motion, Klure once again argues that the case of City of McCaEl v. Seubert, 142 
Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 1 1 18 (2006) carves out a statutory basis for business damages under Idaho 
Code 7-7 1 l(2) such that a qualifying business only has to comply with a single clause of the 
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statute, and it can ignore the remainder of the subsection, as well as the rest of section 7-71 1 and 
the entire statutory framework in which the statute is located. As explained at length in ACHD's 
prior submittals, Klure's argument is contrary to the law in Idaho and is expressly contradicted 
by Idaho's Constitution, statutes, and Idaho case law. (See ACHD's Resp. to Pla. Mtn. for 
Surnm. Judg. (Sept. 25,2008); ACHD's Resp. to Pla. Post-Hearing Communication with Court 
Re: Mtn. to Dismiss (Jan. 15,2008)). 
Additionally, the Seubert case upon which Klure relies does not support Klure's 
argument that no taking is required before business damages under Idaho Code 5 7-7 1 1 can be 
assessed, and in fact, it expressly refutes the argument. The portion of the Seubert case regularly 
cited by Klure in support of his argument states that: 
. . . [Tlhe City's argument than an interest in remaining on the land 
sufficient to claim business damages must be proved by a written 
lease or agreement attempts to import a requirement into the statute 
that does not exist. A business need only meet the statutory 
requirements of I.C. 5 7-711 in order to make a claim for 
damages resulting from the taking of the underlying property. 
"The right to receive business damages . . . resulting from a taking 
of land is strictly a statutory right.. ." 29A C.J.S. EMINENT DOMAIN 
tj 150 (2004). 
(Klure's Memo. in Support of Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Withdraw Judgment at 2-3 
(quoting City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho at 584, 130 P.3d at 1122 (emphasis of underscored 
text added, emphasis of bolded text in Klure's original); see also Klure's Memo. in Supp. of 
Mtn. for Summ. Judg. at 4-5). Of the cited portion of text above, Klure focuses entirely on the 
first part of the bolded sentence that states that "A business need only meet the statutory 
requirements of I.C. § 7-71 1 in order to make a claim for damages . . . ." However, Klure 
chooses to ignore the last portion of the sentence and the rest of the quotation that says that the 
business damages under Idaho Code 5 7-7 1 1 are awarded "for damages resulting from the taking 
of the underlying property." Seubert, 142 Idaho at 584, 130 P.3d at 1122. The Seubert Court's 
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reference to the requirement that a "taking" occur before the business damages can be awarded 
underscores the fact that the Seubert case involved an inverse condemnation claim and that a 
business damages under Idaho Code 5 7-71 1 necessarily requires the "taking of the underlying 
property." Klure's selective reading of the Seubert decision is not supported by Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision in Seubert or by the statutory framework for business damage awards. 
The Court in its Decision and Order concluded that under a correct reading of the Seubert 
case, Idaho Code i j  7-71 l(2) does not create an action separate and apart from eminent domain 
law. (Decision and Order at 9); see also City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho at 584, 130 P.3d at 
1122 ("Idaho Code 5 7-71 1 sets forth the requirements a business must meet in order to make a 
claim for business damages in an eminent domain proceeding.") (emphasis added)). 
Additionally, the Court noted the Seubert Court's confirmation of the taking requirement for 7- 
7 1 1 business damages and clearly distinguished Seubert from this present case by pointing out 
that in Seubert was "the subject of a taking" which entitled the landowner to damages under 
Idaho's eminent domain statutes, whereas in the present case, no taking of Klure's property had 
occurred. (Decision and Order at 9). As a result, the Court correctly concluded that Klure is not 
entitled to recover business damages from ACHD under Idaho Code fj 7-71 1, and Klure has 
provided no legitimate basis for the Court to reconsider its decision. 
Klure next argues that even if this is an inverse condemnation case, the Court erred in 
concluding that no taking occurred as a result of ACHD's purchase of Dr. Curtis's property. 
Klure again renews his prior argument that because a portion of the property was needed for the 
Ustick project, then the purchase of a larger portion of property "must be considered to have 
been a taking." (Klure's Memo. in Support of Motion to Reconsider and Motion to Withdraw 
Judgment at 3). Klure does not provide any new support, authority or argument for his assertion, 
but instead renews his prior arguments that (1) a Nevada Supreme Court case held that the 
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purchase of property made under "threat of condemnation constitutes" a "taking" and (2) that 
Klure owned an interest in the property up until just before ACHD's purchase. Klure arguments 
should once again be rejected because contrary to the Nevada case cited by Klure, applicable 
Idaho law provides that a purchase of property by a governmental entity with condemnation 
authority does not amount to a taking. City of Lewiston v. Lindsey, 123 Idaho 85 1, 853 P.2d 596, 
603 (Ct. App. 1993). Additionally, the factual record is clear that when ACHD purchased the 
Dr. Curtis's property, Klure neither owned any interest in the property or operated his business 
on the property. (Price Aff. at 77 31,55, 59-60,64 Exs. D, G, J, Section H; Decision and Order 
at 7-8, 10-1 1). Thus, no taking of Klure's property occurred. 
Klure's final argument in support of his motion for reconsideration is that there are issues 
remaining in this case that were not raised in the summary judgment motion and that still need to 
be decided by the jury at trial. Namely, Klure argues that a determination must still be made as 
to the manner in which Klure was damaged, as well as the amount of damages suffered by Klure. 
Klure's arguments are without support or basis, since in order for the damage issues to become 
ripe, there must first be a determination that a taking occurred. Covington v. Jefferson County, 
137 Idaho 777,780,53 P.3d 828,831 (2002) ("An inverse condemnation action cannot be 
maintained unless an actual taking of private property is established."); KMST LLC v. Courzty of 
Ada, 138 Idaho 577,581,67 P.3d 56,60 (2003) (requiring that claims for damages under Idaho's 
eminent domain statutes cannot be maintained "unless there has actually been a taking of his or 
her property."). Where there is no taking, Klure cannot recover damages against ACHD as a 
matter of law, and therefore the issues relating to the manner in which damages were sustained 
and the amount of damages incurred are moot. 
The Court correctly ruled that there was no taking by ACHD and that "there was no right 
to any business damages under I.C. 5 7-71 1(2)." (Decision and Order at 10). Klure has not 
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provided any new legal authority or facts requiring the Court to reconsider its prior decision, and 
the Court should deny Klure's request to do so. 
C.  Judgment was Properly Entered by the Court Because its Decision and Order Fully 
Disposed of Klure's Remaining Claims Against ACHD. 
In his motion, Klure requests that the Court withdraw its judgment entered on February 
12,2009 pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. A Rule 59(e) motion is 
committed to the sound discretion of the Court, and an order denying a Rule 59(e) motion will 
only be overturned on appeal if there is a showing that there has been a "manifest abuse of 
discretion." Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 344, 179 P.3d 303, 307 (2008) (citing Couer 
d'Alene Mining Co. v. First National Bank ofNorth Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 
1037 (2006)). 
The Court properly entered judgment in favor of ACWD because it had fully disposed of 
all of claims remaining in the case, such that no claims were left for the Court to decide. The 
Court dismissed Klure's claims for relocation damages on February 19,2008, and it dismissed 
Klure's claims for business damages and under an inverse condemnation theory on January 26, 
2009. (Decision and Order Re: Motion to Dismiss at 11; Decision and Order at 7). Therefore, 
upon the entry of the Court's January 26,2009 Decision and Order there were no remaining 
claims left for the Court to adjudicate, and final judgment was properly entered. 
Klure argues that the Court erred in entering judgment for ACHD when ACHD did not 
file its own motion for summary judgment. However, Idaho law provides otherwise. In Idaho, 
the Court has discretion to grant summary judgment in favor of the non-moving party upon the 
denial of the moving party's motion. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 702,706,202 P.3d 642, 
656 (2008). As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hanvood v. Tulbert, 136 Idaho 672,677, 
39 P.3d 612, 517 (2001): 
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The district court may grant summary judgment to a non-moving 
party even if the party has not filed its own motion with the court. 
A motion for summary judgment allows the court to rule on the 
issues placed before it as a matter of law; the moving party runs 
the risk that the court will find against is, as in this case. 
Id. 
Therefore, where Klure filed his motion for summary judgment seeking to have ACHD 
held liable for Klure's "business damages," Klure brought the issue before the Court of whether 
a "taking" had occurred and whether Klure was entitled to business damages from ACHD. 
Through his motion, Klure "ran the risk" of the Court ruling that he was not entitled to business 
damages and that ACHD would not be held liable to Klure. Consistent with Idaho law 
governing the entry of judgments in favor of the non-moving party, upon rendering its Decision 
and Order denying Klure's motion and resolving the remaining claims against ACHD, the Court 
properly entered judgment in favor of ACHD. 
Klure also complains in his motion about the timing of the Court's entry of judgment. 
Contrary to Klure's suggestion, the Court's entry of judgment was not improper. ACHD's 
motion for entry of judgment was made under Rule %(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
based upon the provisions of the rule stating that a "judgment shall be entered by the judge or 
clerk" upon a decision by the court that all relief shall be denied. (ACHD Mtn. for Entry of 
Judgment). The Court's Decision and Order effectively concluded that Klure was not entitled to 
any of the relief requested in his Complaint or Amended Complaint and therefore, because a 
summary judgment order does not constitute a final judgment, the entry of judgment under Rule 
58 was appropriate. See I.R.C.P. 58(a); Hunting v. Clark County Sch. Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho 
634,637,93 1 P.2d 628,631 (1997). 
Moreover, where it is "emphatically the province and the responsibility of the judge to 
ascertain that the judgment is timely entered," the Court appropriately recognized that the case 
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had been fully resolved as a result of its denial of Klure's summary judgment motion, and 
therefore promptly entered judgment concluding the case. Ward v. Lupinacci, 1 1 1 Idaho 40,43, 
720 P.2d 223,226 (Ct. App. 1986). Therefore, Klure's motion to withdraw judgment should be 
denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Klure's motion for reconsideration basically consists of the same arguments previously 
considered and rejected by the Court. Klure has failed to offer any new basis or justification for 
the Court to reconsider it prior decision and reach a different conclusion. Through its decision 
issued on February 26,2008 and January 26,2009, the Court dismissed all claims presented by 
Klure in this action, leaving no issue remaining for the Court to resolve. The Court concluded 
that no taking of Klure's properly had occurred and that absent such a taking there was no basis 
for Klure to recover damages against ACHD. Having denied Klure's motion for summary 
judgment and resolved all claims presented by Klure in this matter in ACHD's favor, the Court 
properly entered judgment for ACHD in this case. Accordingly Klure's motion for 
reconsideration and withdrawal of judgment is properly denied. 
DATED this 29th day of April, 2009. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Ada Co@ighway fhtr ict  
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ACHD, which prevailed on summary judgment in this cause, filed a request for its 
attorney fees and discretionary costs. It asserts that it is entitled to attorney fees pursuant 
to I.C. 9 12-120(3) and I.C. 9 12-12 1. ACHD did not incur any costs of right. 
Attorney fees are awardable to the prevailing party in a commercial transaction 
pursuant to I.C. 5 12-120(3). The gravamen of the action must be a commercial 
transaction between the parties for I.C. 8 12-120(3) to apply. See, e.g., Freiburger v. J- 
U-B Engineers, hc . ,  141 Idaho 415,423, 1 1 1 P.3d 100, 108 (2005); Great Plains 
Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466,471,36 P.3d 2 18, 223 
(2001). Attorney fees are not awarded every time a commercial transaction is connected 
with a case. Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420,426,987 P.2d 
1035, 1041 (1999) (citing Ervin Construction Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695,704,874 
P.2d 506, 5 15 (1993)). Rather, attorney fees are only awarded when the commercial 
transaction is integral to the claim and constitutes the basis upon which the party is 
attempting to recover. Esser Elec. v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 145 Idaho 
912,921, 188 P.3d 854, 863 (2008). "The critical test is whether the commercial 
transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; the commercial transaction must be 
integral to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the party is attempting to 
recover." Id. at 921 quoting Ervin Constr. Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695,704,874 
P.2d 506,515 (1993); In re Ryder, 141 Idaho 918, 120 P.3d 736 (2005). 
The commercial transaction must be an actual basis of the complaint, that is, the 
lawsuit and its causes of action must be based on a commercial transaction, not simply a 
situation that can be characterized as a commercial transaction. Great Plains Equipment, 
136 Idaho at 471,36 P.3d at 223 (citation omitted). "To hold otherwise would be to 
convert the award of attorney's fees from an exceptional remedy justified only by 
statutory authority to a matter of right in virtually every lawsuit filed." Id. (citation 
omitted). 
In this case, the "gravamen" of Dr. Klure's complaint against ACHD was based 
upon Title 7, Chapter 7 of the Idaho Code, Idaho's eminent domain statutes. Dr. Klure's 
complaint, in relevant part, states: "Plaintiff Maple Grove seeks a declaratory ruling that 
it is entitled to seek damages &om Defendant under I.C. 5 7-7 1 l(2) and an award of such 
damages." Complaint, 7 1 (Nature of Action). While the Court did not accept Dr. 
Klure's arguments that he was entitled to damages under the eminent domain statutes, 
that was the gravamen of his case. The lawsuit was filed and pursued throughout the 
proceedings according to Dr. Klure's interpretation of I.C. 5 7-71 1 (2), an eminent domain 
statute. While there was a commercial transaction between Dr. Curtis and ACHD, there 
was not one between Dr. Klure and ACHD and he sought damages under his theory of 
recovery under his statutory theory about I.C. 9 7-71 1. ACHD is not entitled to attorney 
fees under Idaho Code 5 12-120(3). 
ACHD has also requested attorney fees pursuant to I.C. fj 12-121 which can be 
awarded to the prevailing party if the Court determines the action was brought or pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57,69, 
190 P.3d 876, 888 (2008) (citing Baker v. Sullivan, 132 Idaho 746,751,979 P.2d 619, 
624 (1999)). When deciding whether a case was brought, pursued, or defended 
fi-ivolously, unreasonably or without foundation, the entire course of litigation must be 
taken into account. McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551,562,82 P.3d 833,844 (2003) 
(citing Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 5 18, 
524,20 P.3d 702, 708 (2001)). When a party pursues an action which contains fairly 
debatable issues, the action is not considered to be fitlvolous and without foundation, and 
thus attorney fees should not be awarded. C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763,769,25 
P.3d 76,82 (2001) (citing Lowery v. Board of County Comm'rs, 115 Idaho 64,69,764 
P.2d 43 1,436 (Ct. App. 1988)). 
In this case, while the Court did not accept his argument, it does not follow that 
Dr. Klure pursued this case Etlvolously, unreasonably or without foundation. There is 
only one Supreme Court decision addressing a claim of damages under I.C. $ 7-71 1(2), 
City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580,130 P.3d 1 1 18 (2006). In Seubei-t, there was a 
direct condemnation action initiated by the Idaho Transportation Department. Whether a 
"taking" had occurred was not the issue in that case. Rather, the central issue was 
whether a business was entitled to damages under I.C. 5 7-71 l(2) once a "taking" by the 
condemnor had already been established. Although Dr. Klure's interpretation of Seubert 
was incorrect, his position was not pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. Therefore, ACHD is not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code $ 12- 12 1. 
Discretionary costs are awarded pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(l) upon a 
showing that they "were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred" which 
should "in the interest of justice" be awarded to the prevailing party. The research 
copying and telephone charges were certainly necessary and appear reasonably incurred, 
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however, it cannot be said that, in litigation of this type, they were exceptional. They 
appear to be the kind of costs which would customarily be incurred in this type of case. 
The request for discretionary costs is denied. 
For the reasons stated in this Order, the motion for attorney fees and discretionary 
costs is denied. 
It is so ordered. 
Date; this 30" day of April, 2009. 
- 
Deborah A. Bail 
District Judge 
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ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
Defendant. ! 
CASE NO. CV OC 071 638 1 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR WITHDRAWAL OF 
JUDGMENT- 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon the Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Withdrawal of Judgment and the Court having considered the arguments of the parties; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Withdrawal of Judgment 
is GRANTED for the reasons stated upon the record at the hearing on May 6,2009, and 
the Judgment entered on 
DATED this 
Distnct Judge 
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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
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ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
Defendant. 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon the Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Reconsideration and this Court having considered the arguments of the parties; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration is 
DENIED for the reasons stated upon the record at the hearing on May 6, 2009. 
DATED this l@day o f b  
District Judge 
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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDER4TION - 2 
MAY 2 0 2009 
BY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CURTIS-KLURE, PLLC, dba MAPLE GROVE 
DENTISTRY, and JACK D. KLURE, D.D.S., 
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
Case No. CV OC 071 638 1 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Defendant. 
BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiffs Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba Maple Grove 
Dentistry, and Jack D. Klure, D.D.S.'s ("Klure") Motion for Reconsideration of 
Decision and Order and Wi~hdrawal of Judgment. The Court has reviewed the Motion 
and supporting briefs and has heard arguments of counsel on behalf of the parties, and 
finding good cause, the Court hereby denies Klure's motion and enters Judgment in this 
matter as follows: 
On February 19, 2008, the Court entered its Decision and Order Re: Motion to 
Dismiss dismissing Plaintiffs Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba Maple Grove Dentistry, and Jack 
D. Klure, D.D.S.'s ("Klure") claim for relocation damages. The Court determined as a 
matter of law that Klure's claim for relocation damages under I.C. § 40-2004 was not 
properly before the Court, and should have been brought, if at all, as a petition for 
judicial review. 
On January 36, 2009, the Court entered its Decision and Order denying Klure's 
motion for on summary judgment, determining as a matter of law that Klure was not 
FINAL JUDGMENT - 1 
entitled to business darnages under Idaho Code 8 7-71 l (2 )  or his inverse condemnation 
claim. The Court's ruling fully adjudicated and resolved Klure's claims in favor of 
ACHD. 
Based on the Court's Decision and Order, on February 6, 2009 ACHD filed a 
Motion for Entry of Judgment pursuant to Rule 58(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and the Court subsequently entered Judgment in this matter on February 10, 
2009. 
On February 24, 2009, Klure filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Decision and 
Order and Withdrawal of Judgment. The matter was fully briefed by the parties and a 
hearing was held on the motion on May 6, 2009. At the commencement of the hearing, 
the Court withdrew the February 10, 2009 Judgment and proceeded to hear arguments 
on  Klure's Motion for Reconsideration. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court 
denied Klure's motion and reaffirmed its prior Decision and Order issued on January 
26, 2009. 
Through the decisions referenced above, the Court has resolved all claims 
between the parties and fully and finally adjudicated this matter. 
Based upon the foregoing, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Final Judgment 
is hereby entered in favor of Defendant ACHD and that Plaintiffs Curtis-Klure, PLLC, 
dba Maple Grove Dentistry, and Jack D. Klure, D.D.S. take nothing by their Complaint. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this matter, 
and all claims by Plaintiffs, should be, and are hereby, DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE. 
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DATED this /?>aay of 
District Court Judge 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this fl day of 2009, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by below, and - 
addressed to the following: 
Gary G. Allen 
Debora K. Kristensen 
Martin Hendrickson 
GIVENS PURSLEY I ,LP 
60 1 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701 -2720 
Phone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
J. Frederick Mack 
Steven C. Bowman 
Mary V. York 
Holland & Hart LLP 
10 1 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701-2527 
Phone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
[I1 Overnight Mail 
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GARY G. ALLEN (ISB # 4366) 
DEBORA K. KRISTENSEN (ISB #5337) 
MARTIN HENDRICKSON (ISB #5876) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 8370 1-2720 
Telephone: 208-388-1200 
Facsimile: 208-388-1 300 
Attorneys for Appellants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
VS. 
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
CURTIS-KLURE, PLLC, dba MAPLE 
GROVE DENTISTRY, and JACK D. 
KLURE, D.D.S., 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
TO: RESPONDENT ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT AND ITS 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD: 
CASE NO. CV OC 07 1638 1 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
I .  The above-named Plaintiffs/Appellants Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba Maple 
Grove Dentistry, and Jack D. Klure, D.D.S. (collectively "Appellants") appeal against the 
above-named Respondent Ada Co~lnty Highway District ("ACHD") to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the Decision and Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and all previous and subsequent Judgments and Orders including, without 
limitation, the Final Judgment entered on May 20, 2009, the Honorable Judge Deborah 
Bail presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
2.  That the Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and 
the order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to 
Rule 1 l(a)(l), I.A.R. 
3. Preliminary Statement of Issues on Appeal: 
a) Whether the Court erred in denying the Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 
b) Whether the Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 
the Defendant; 
c) Whether the Court erred in denying Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Reconsideration; and 
d) Whether the Court erred in entering its final judgment against the 
Plaintiffs. 
4. A reporter's transcript is NOT requested. 
5.  The Appellants request the following docuinents to be il~cludetf in the 
Clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, 
I.A.R.: 
a) Defendant's Motion to Dismiss; 
b) Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss; 
c) Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss; 
d) Defendai~t's Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss; 
e) Defendant's Response to Post-Hearing Communication Re: 
Motion to Dismiss 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
Affidavit of M. York in Support of Defendant's Response to Post- 
Hearing Communication Re: Motion to Dismiss; 
Decision and Order Re: Motion to Dismiss; 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Suppoi-t of Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
Affidavit of J. Klure in Support of Motion for Summary Judgnlent; 
Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
Affidavit of S. Price in Support of Defendant's Response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend; 
Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Sumnlary 
Judgment ; 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Suinmary Judgment; 
Decision and Order; 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Decision and Order and 
Withdrawal of Judgment; 
Second Affidavit of J. Klure; 
Defendant's Response to Motion for Reconsideration and to 
Withdraw Judgment; 
Order Re: Costs and Fees; 
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u) Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of 
Decision and Order and Withdrawal of Judgment; 
v) Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration; and 
w) Order Granting Motion for Withdrawal of Judgment Nunc Pro 
6. 1 certify: 
a) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has 
been paid; 
b) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; 
c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be sewed 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
54- 
DATED this 1 day of July 2009. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP . 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
st- 
I hereby certify that on the 1day of July, 2009, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was senred upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated: 
J. Frederick Mack 
Steven C. Bowman 
Mary V. York 
HOLLANI) & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile (208) 343-8869 
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U.S. mail, postage prepaid d
C] express mail 
C] hand delivery 
C] facsimile 
J. Frederick Mack (ISB No. 1428) 
Steven C. Bowman (ISB No. 4404) 
Mary V. York (ISB No. 5020) 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
Suite 1400, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2527 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-5000 
Facsimile: (208) 343-8869 
j. ~ ~ s D  p;iAVtiHAO, Gleik 
By E. HOWIES 
CEP W 
ORIGINAL 
Attorneys for Defendant Ada County Highway District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CURTIS-KLURE, PLLC, dba MAPLE GROVE 
DENTISTRY, and JACK D. KLURE, D.D.S., 
TO: APPELLANTS CURTIS-KLURE, PLLC, dba MAPLE GROVE 
DENTISTRY, and JACK D. KLURE, D.D.S. 
Case No. CV OC 07 1638 1 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
v. 
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent in the above entitled proceeding 
REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT 
AND ADDITIONAL RECORD ON 
APPEAL 
hereby requests pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following material in the 
reporter's transcript and in the clerk's record in addition to that required to be included by the 
I.A.R. and the notice of appeal: 
1. Reporter's Transcript: 
a) The entire transcript of the hearing of Defendant/Respondent9s Motion to 
Dismiss held on January 8,2008. 
b) The entire transcript of the hearing on PlaintiffsIAppellants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment held on November 12,2008. 
RIEQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT AND ADDITIONAL RECORD ON APPEAL - 1 
o n a  G n  
c) The entire transcript of the hearing on PlaintiffslAppellants' Motion for 
Reconsideration of Decision and Order and Withdrawal of Judgment held 
on May 6,2009. 
2. Clerk's Record: 
a) Defendant/Respondent7s Motion for Entry of Judgment. 
3. I certify that a copy of this request for transcript has been served on each court 
reporter of whom both paper and electronic transcripts are requested as named 
below at the addresses set out below and that estimated number of additional 
pages being requested is 100. I further certify that the Respondent has paid the 
estimated fee for preparing the requested portions of the reporter's transcript. 
Name & address of court reporter: Susan Gambee, 200 W. Front Street, Boise, ID 
83702. 
4. 1 further certify that this request for additional record has been served upon the 
clerk of the district court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. 
DATED this 14th day of July, 2009. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
=QUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT AND ADDITIONAL RECORD ON APPEAL - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of July, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Gary G. Allen &US. Mail 
Debora K. Kristensen Hand Delivered 
Martin Hendrickson Overnight Mail 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP Facsimile 
601 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 8370 1-2720 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1 300 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Curtis-Klure, PLLC, dba Maple 
Grove Dentistry and Jack D. Klure, D.D.S. 
REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT AND ADDITIONAL RECORD ON APPEAL - 3 
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TO: Clerk of the Court 
ldaho Supreme Court 
Boise, ldaho 83720 
Docket No. 36647-2009 
CURTIS-KLURE 
vs. 
ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT 
Notice is  hereby given that on August 5, 2009,l lodged a transcript of 
102 pages in length for the above-referenced appeal with the District 
Court Clerk of the County of Ada, in the Fourth Judicial District. 
This transcript contains hearings held on: 
.. January 8,2008 
.. November 12,2008 
.. May 6,2009 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 West Front Street 
Boise, ldaho 83702 
(208) 287-7581 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CURTIS-KLURE, PLLC, dba MAPLE 




ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 36647 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHLBITS 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to 
the Record: 
1. Defendant's Brief In Support Of Motion To Dismiss, filed November 15,2007. 
2. Memorandum In Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss, filed 
December 3 1,2007. 
3. Defendant ACHD's Reply Brief In Support Of Motion To Dismiss, filed January 4,2008. 
4. Affidavit Of Mary V. York In Support Of Defendant ACHD's Response To Plaintiffs' 
Post-Hearing Communication With Court Re: Motion To Dismiss, filed 
January 15,2008. 
5. Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment, filed 
August 1 1,2008. 
6. Affidavit Of Jack D. Klure D.D.S. In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment, filed 
August 11,2008. 
7. Affidavit Of Steven B. Price In Support Of ACHD's Response To Plaintiffs' Motion For 
Summary Judgment, filed September 25,2008. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
8. Affidavit Of Counsel In Support Of Reply To Motion For Summary Judgment, filed 
October 10, 2008. 
9. Second Affidavit Of Jack D. Klure D.D.S., filed March 10,2009. 
10. Reply Brief In Support Of Motion To Reconsider And Withdraw Judgment, filed 
May 4,2009. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 18th day of September, 2009. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL, DISTRICTOF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CURTIS-KLURE, PLLC, dba MAPLE 




ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court Case No. 36647 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certiQ that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
MARTIN C. HENDRICKSON 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
" , -3 <> 
>&? ; *: QJy 
Date of Service: 
MARY V. YORK 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CURTIS-KLURE, PLLC, dba MAPLE 




ADA COUNTY HIGHWAY DISTRICT, 
Defendant-Respondent . 
Supreme Court Case No. 36647 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
1 st day of July, 2009. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
